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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

- FREEDOM OF RELIGION - BLOOD TRANSFUSIONS MAY BE ADMINISTERED TO EXPECTANT MOTHER DESPITE
HER RELIGIOUS OBJECTIONS IF NECESSARY TO SAVE HER LIFE OR
THAT OF HER CHILD.

Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson
(N.J. 1964)
The defendant, a Jehovah's Witness, was a maternity patient at plaintiff hospital. She had requested that no blood transfusions be administered
to her since they were forbidden by the tenets of her religion.' When the
hospital brought this action "seeking authority to administer blood transfusions to the defendant ... in the event that such transfusions should be
necessary to save her life and the life of her unborn child,"'2 defendant was
more than seven and a half months pregnant. At trial the evidence
established that at some time during her pregnancy defendant would
probably hemorrhage severely with the result that both she and her unborn child would perish unless such transfusion was administered. The
trial court held that judicial intervention was not permissible in the case
of either the mother or the foetus. The Supreme Court of New Jersey,
in a unanimous opinion, reversed, holding that the child in the womb was
a proper subject for the law's protection and that blood transfusions might
be administered if necessary to save the life of the mother or the child. 3
1. The Jehovah's Witnesses cite as support for their belief that blood transfusions
are forbidden by Divine Law, several passages from the Old Testament and one passage
from the New Testament. Representative of the Old Testament passages are the
following: "You must not eat any fat or any blood at all" (Leviticus 3:17) ; "You
must not eat the blood of any sort of flesh, because the soul of every sort of flesh is
its blood" (Leviticus 17:13, 14) ; and "As for any man of the house of Israel or some
alien in your midst who eats any sort of blood, I shall certainly set my face against
the soul that is eating the blood, and I shall indeed cut him off from among his people"
(Leviticus 17:10). The New Testament passage cited is, "For the holy spirit and we
ourselves have favored adding no further burden to you except these necessary things,
to keep yourselves free . . . from blood . . ." (Acts 15:28, 29). In attempting to
persuade Jehovah's Witnesses to consent to blood transfusions, hospital authorities
often argue that receiving blood intravenously is not "eating blood." This argument
has been forcefully answered. "The law God gave to Noah made it unlawful for anyone
to eat blood, that is to use it for nourishment or to sustain life.... It has no bearing
on the matter that the blood is not introduced to the body through the mouth but
through the veins." WATCH TOWER BIBLE & TRACT SOCIETY OP PENNSYLVANIA, BLOOD,
MEDICINE AND THE LAW Op GOD (1961), p. 14.

2. Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421,
201 A.2d 537 (1964).
3. When faced with such a court order, a Jehovah's Witness is morally bound by
the words of Acts 5:29: "We ought to obey God rather than man." The conscientious
Jehovah's Witness
...will do everything reasonably possible to contravene such a court order. ...
This does not mean that the conscientious witness of Jehovah will attempt to
resist the enforcement of the court order by any physical violence. Rather he

(140)
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Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421,
201 A.2d 537 (1964).
With the possible exception of the flag salute decisions, 4 no single
group of cases brought under the free exercise clause of the first amendment has presented more delicate problems of balancing interests than
those involving compulsory medical attention. For in this area other constitutional freedoms, to wit, the personal liberty of the individual and the
right of parents to the care and custody of their children, are frequently
included in the equation along with freedom of religion, thus compounding
the difficulty of finding a constitutionally sound result.
In Sadlock v. Bd. of Educ.5 the exclusion of a child from a public
school for failure to comply with a pre-entrance vaccination requirement
was held not to be a violation of the child's personal or religious liberties.
The landmark case of Jacobson v. Massachusetts6 was cited as controlling
although the petitioner in that case, an adult, had refused to be vaccinated
for purely secular reasons and had advanced no argument based on
freedom of religion. Statutes providing for fluoridation of water supplies
have generally been upheld by the courts over objections that such statutes
represent an infringement on religious freedom.' The argument of the
objectors seems to be that chemical treatment of the water supply is a
form of medication and as such is forbidden by the tenets of certain
religious sects. In People v. Pierson8 defendant's conviction for failure to
provide medical care for his dying child was affirmed despite his argument
that such failure was based on his belief in Divine healing. "The peace and
safety of the state," said the court, "involve the protection of the lives and
health of its children . . ." That this view is widely accepted by American
will avail himself of all proper and convenient and opportune ways of contravening

the court order so that it cannot be carried out by the enforcers of the court
order except by their use of violence and bodily assault. .
. Unless the conscientious witness of Jehovah knows within himself that he has done everything
possible within reason and right and without injury to another to observe God's
law foremost, and to nullify the effect of the court order against him, he knows
within himself that upon being subjected to such a forced blood transfusion by
court order he is . . .guilty of offending God. . . . The conscientious witness of
Jehovah knows, furthermore, that his taking blood into his system under such circumstances will come up for review before the congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses
of which he is an acting member. When the judicial committee appointed by the
congregation examines into his case if it finds that he has not done everything
possible and within reason and right to avoid the forcible enforcement of the
judicial court order upon his person, but has willingly submitted to its enforcement
without recourse to all available steps and measures, then the congregation's
judicial committee will find him guilty of willfully violating the law of God and
will issue a decree of excommunication against him.
Letter from the Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc., to the
Villanova Law Review, October 6, 1964.
4. See, e.g., West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).

5.137 N.J.L. 85, 58 A.2d 218 (1948).
6.197 U.S. 11 (1905).
7. See, e.g., De Aryan v. Butler, 119 Cal. App. 2d 674, 260 P.2d 98 (1953),
cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1012 (1954) ; Kraus v. Cleveland, 163 Ohio St. 559, 127 N.E.2d
609 (1955), appeal dismissed, 351 U.S. 935 (1956) ; Dowell v. Tulsa, 273 P.2d 859
(Okla. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 912 (1955).

8.176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E.243 (1903).
9. Id. at 211, 68 N.E.at 246.
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courts is demonstrated by a plethora of decisions ordering medical treatment for children regardless of parental objections, religious1 ° and otherwise." According to the Pierson court the failure of parents to provide
medical attention for their children when necessary is a public wrong
2
which the state, under its police powers, may prevent.'
The police power is only one basis upon which judicial intervention
may be justified for the purpose of protecting children; the general equity
power is another.' 3 Still another basis, and the one most commonly used,
is the doctrine of parens patriae.14 This is the ground upon which the
5
New Jersey Supreme Court rested its decision in State v. Perricone,1
one of the two decisions cited by the same court in the instant case. In
Perricone, the parents of a "blue baby," Jehovah's Witnesses, refused on
grounds of religious conviction to consent to a blood transfusion for their
child, knowing that without a transfusion the child would die. In affirming
the lower court's decision ordering that the transfusions be administered,
the court cited the famous cases of Reynolds v. United States,'0 Davis v.
Beason,17 and Cantwell v. Connecticut.'8 In those cases the right of the
individual to the free exercise of his religion was divided into two parts the absolute freedom to believe, and the limited freedom to carry those
beliefs into action., The landmark case involving a conflict between the
doctrine of parens patriae and the doctrines of religious freedom and
parental custody is Prince v. Massachusetts'9 in which the United States
Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of a Jehovah's Witness who had
violated the Massachusetts child labor laws by encouraging her infant ward
to distribute religious literature on the public streets.
Keeping in mind the holding in Perricone, it is interesting to note
another New Jersey case, Hoener v. Bertinato,20 in which medical evidence
showed that the foetus would require a transfusion soon after birth. The
expectant mother, a Jehovah's Witness, refused to consent to the transfusion on religious grounds. Her refusal was held to constitute "neglect"
under a statute which permitted the removal of the child from his parents'
custody. 21 The court, utilizing the doctrine of parens patriae, ordered that
the transfusion be administered when required. The court said, "The
10. See, e.g., People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769
952) ; Hoener v.Bertinato, 67 N.J. Super. 517, 171 A.2d 140 (1961) ; Santos v.
ldstein, 16 App. Div. 2d 755, 227 N.Y.S.2d 450 (1962) ; In the interest of Clark,
185 N.E.2d 128 (O.C.P. 1962).
11. See, e.g., In re Vasko, 238 App. Div. 138, 263 N.Y.S. 552 (1933); In re
Rotkowitz, 175 Misc. 948, 25 N.Y.S.2d 624 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1941).
12. People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 211, 68 N.E. 243, 247 (1903).
13. In the Interest of Clark, 185 N.E.2d 128, 129 (O.C.P. 1962); 3 POM4ROY,
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §

1307 (3d ed. 1905).

14. For a detailed history of the concept of parens patriae, see Lippincott v.
Lippincott, 97 N.J.E. 517, 128 At. 254 (1925).
15. 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962).
16. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
17. 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
18. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
19. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
20. 67 N.J. Super. 517, 171 A.2d 140 (1961).
9,§ 2-9 to -11 (1960).
21. N.J. STrAT. ANN. tit.
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provisions of N.J.S.A. 9:2-9 to 9:2-11,. inclusive, on a cursory reading,
would seem to refer to a child who has been born.... But there is nothing
in any of these provisions which would preclude their application to an
unborn child."'22 In support of this statement the Bertinato court cited
Smith v. Brennan,23 the other case cited in the principal case.
In Brennan, the New Jersey Supreme Court joined the growing
number of jurisdictions which allow an infant to sue for compensation
for injuries received while in the womb of his mother. The court further
stated that the distinction between viable and non-viable foetii defied
practical application and was irrelevant as to the question whether an infant
should have an action for pre-natal injuries.
The instant case, then, as regards the infant in the womb, represents
a significant extension of the parens patriae doctrine insofar as it declares
that transfusions may be administered to the mother, against her will, in
order to save the baby's life. This, however, is not the furthest extent
of its holding. The court further holds that transfusions may be administered to the mother if necessary to save her life. Only one other case has
been found which goes so far. In Application of the President and Directors
of Georgetown College, Inc.,24 hospital authorities applied for a court
order authorizing them to administer blood transfusions to a woman who
had lost two-thirds of her blood because of a ruptured ulcer. The woman
and her husband, both Jehovah's Witnesses, refused to consent to the
transfusions on religious grounds, although without the transfusions death
was imminent. When the District of Columbia District court denied the
application, counsel for the hospital immediately applied to Judge Wright
as a member of the Court of Appeals for the desired order. Judge Wright,
after consulting with the hospital authorities, the dying woman, and her husband, signed the order allowing the hospital to administer the transfusions.
The principal case presents two very important constitutional issues
concerning the rights of the individual: (1) may the state compel a mother
to submit to a blood transfusion, over her religious objection, in order to
save the life of her unborn child, and (2) may the state compel an individual
to submit to a blood transfusion in order to save her own life where she
has refused such transfusions on the grounds that they violate a basic
tenet of her religion.
In regard to the first issue, it has been seen above that the state may
punish a parent for failure to supply a child with medical attention when
necessary and that religious belief is no defense. The analogy between
telling a father that he must employ a physician, against his religious belief,
in order to save the life of his child and telling a mother that she must
undergo a transfusion, against her religious belief, in order to save the
life of her unborn child is an appealing one. A significant distinguishing
factor is that the latter situation involves an invasion of the person. How22. Hoener y. Bertinato, 67 N.J. Super. 517, 171 A.2d 140, 143-44 (1961).
23. 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960).
24. 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
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ever, it has also been seen that punishment for failure to submit to state
ordered medical attention has been held constitutional and that religious
belief will provide no exception. The limits on religious freedom begin to
operate, said Mr. Justice Jackson ".

.

. whenever activities begin to affect

or collide with liberties of others or of the public."'25 By citing Brennan
the court in the noted case sought to establish that the infant in the defendant's womb was an "other," that he was an independent legal entity with
a right to live even though the religious beliefs of another called for his
death. The method used by the court to protect the child, as evidenced by
the citing of Perricone, was the doctrine of parens patriae. Unlike Hoener,
which ordered that custody of the child be taken at birth, Raleigh ordered
the appointment of a special guardian for the unborn child and specified
that the duties of the guardian should be "to supervise the care, custody,
'26
and welfare of the unborn child."
Considering the tenor of the opinions in the parens patriae cases, it
seems unlikely that the extension of the doctrine as represented by compelling the mother to undergo a transfusion to save the life of her baby
will be rejected or even seriously disputed by other American courts.
"Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow
they are free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children
before they have reached the age of full and legal discretion when they
27
can make that choice for themselves.
The second issue, however, presents more serious problems. The two
previous decisions cited by the court in Raleigh may well provide authority
for a court order compelling a woman to undergo a transfusion to save
the life of the child in her womb. On the contrary, however, they do not
provide persuasive authority for compelling a woman to undergo a transfusion to save her own life, especially when she objects to the transfusion
on religious grounds. The court in the instant case purports not to decide
"in broad terms"128 the question whether an adult may be compelled to
29
The
submit to such medical procedures when necessary to save his life.
question
this
precise
to
decide
court concluded that it was unnecessary
"because the welfare of the child and the mother are so intertwined and
inseparable that it would be impracticable to attempt to distinguish between
them with respect to the sundry factual patterns which may develop." ' 30 It
is difficult to determine what is meant by "sundry factual patterns." But
the use of such a broad phrase may indicate an attempt to throw up a
smoke-screen to cover the lack of precedent for the holding in regard to
the mother's life, for the holding is clear that transfusions may be administered to save the life of the mother or of the child.
25. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 177 (1944). (Jackson, J., concurring.)
26. Order on Remand, p. 1, Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v.
Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537 (1964).
27. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944).
28. Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201
A.2d 537, 538 (1964).
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
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One possible use of the Perriconecase to support the instant decision
is suggested by Judge Wright in his opinion in Georgetown College.
Having emphasized that the dying woman was the mother of a sevenmonth old child, Judge Wright said:
The state, as parens patriae, will not allow a parent to abandon
a child, and so it should not allow this most ultimate of voluntary
abandonments. The patient had a responsibility to the community to
the people had an interest in preserving
care for her infant. Thus
31
the life of this mother.
The difficulty with this argument is that it can be extended ad infinitum.
A child, at any stage of its development, needs maternal care and assistance
and, for that matter, everyone has some familial ties or responsibilities
upon which the state could predicate interference with one's right to follow
his religious convictions into the grave.
In support of the state's right to forbid an individual to die because
of religious convictions, Judge Wright proffers several other arguments,
only one of which is applicable to the Raleigh case. In those states where
suicide is made criminal, and New Jersey is one of them,3 2 it may be
argued that an individual's deliberate refusal to avail himself of the medical
treatment necessary to preserve his life is tantamount to ending his life
by his own hand. This argument involves two problems, 33 causation and
misfeasance versus non-feasance. An individual dying from natural infirmities such as loss of blood due to delivery of a child or a ruptured
ulcer, has not voluntarily put himself in that position and does not desire
his own death. He merely refuses, on the basis of his religious convictions,
to avail himself of the means necessary to extricate himself from the peril.
If, however, an individual's failure to act in these circumstances was held
to be suicide, the fact that the refusal was based on religious conviction
34
would be no defense.
There are several interesting points of comparison between Raleigh
and Georgetown College. Both were decided under emergency circumstances. Raleigh was argued and decided on the same day. Likewise,
Judge Wright ordered that transfusions be administered to the dying
woman just one hour after the facts were presented to him orally in
chambers. Little time was allowed for full consideration of the legal
problems involved, especially those concerning the constitutional rights of
personal liberty and freedom of religion. The time involved in both cases,
however, was such that emotional considerations undoubtedly put strong
pressure on the courts in each case. Although Georgetown College was
31. Application of the President and Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d
1000, 1008 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
32. N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 2A, § 85-1.
33. These are dismissed by Judge Wright as "quibbles." Application of the
President and Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000, 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
34. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) ; People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y.
201, 68 N.E. 243 (1903).
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cited in plaintiff's brief85 in the principal case, the New Jersey court chose
not to rely upon it in the opinion even though authority for the holding
with respect to the mother's life was sorely lacking.
In conclusion it is submitted that the instant case, because of the
close connection between the lives of mother and child, seems more likely
to stand than Georgetown College.86 However, both decisions, insofar as
they compel an adult, against his religious belief, to accept medical treatment for the purpose of saving his own life represent an unconstitutional
encroachment upon the individual's freedom of religion. If an individual
believes that death is better than violation of religious conviction, he should
be allowed to make that choice.
Edward C. Mengel, Jr.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

IMPOSITION OF COSTS ON DEFENDANT
ACQUITTED OF MISDEMEANOR VIOLATES NEITHER STATE NOR FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONS.

Commonwealth v. Giaccio (Pa. 1964)
Defendant was indicted for the misdemeanor of unlawfully and wantonly pointing and discharging a firearm. The jury returned a verdict of
not guilty but pursuant to a State statute' sentenced defendant to pay the
costs of prosecution. The trial court, on motion by defendant to be relieved
of payment of costs, vacated the sentence, and the Commonwealth appealed.
The superior court reversed and defendant appealed. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the superior court, holding that
the statute authorizing the jury to impose costs of criminal prosecution on
the defendant acquitted of a misdemeanor does not violate the Constitutions
of the United States or of the Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. Giaccio,
415 Pa. 139, 202 A.2d 55 (1964).
At common law, costs lay where they fell and acquitted defendants
were never required to pay the costs of prosecution. 2 Similarly, in the
35. Brief for Plaintiff, p. 7, Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v.
Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537 (1964).
36. In Erickson v. Dilgard, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705 (S.Ct. 1962), the application of a
hospital for an order authorizing the administration of a blood transfusion to a com-

petent adult Jehovah's Witness was denied even though the medical evidence showed
that the patient's chances of recovery without the transfusion were slight. The court
said, "It is the individual who is the subject of a medical decision who has the final
say and . . . this must necessarily be so in a system of government which gives the
greatest possible protection to the individual in the furtherance of his own desires."
Id. at 706.
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1222 (1860). The legislature has provided for the
disposition of costs in misdemeanor cases by the following language: ". . . in all cases
of acquittals by the petit jury on indictments for the offenses aforesaid, the jury
trying the same :shall determine, by their verdict, whether the county, or the prosecutor,
or the defendant shall pay the costs, or whether the same shall be apportioned between
the prosecutor and the defendant, and in what proportions .. "
2. 2 BIsHoP, Nnw CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 1313, 1317 (2d ed. 1913).
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United States, as a general rule acquitted defendants are not subjected
to costs of prosecution. However, the imposition of costs by the jury on a
defendant acquitted of a misdemeanor is a unique practice which has been
followed in Pennsylvania for over a century and a half. In Commonwealth
v. Tilghman,4 an early Pennsylvania case which reviewed the principle,
the supreme court stated that according to the common law a defendant,
though acquitted, always paid court costs. Despite this statement, no
Pennsylvania case has been found dealing with the subject prior to the
enactment of the statutes even though later cases5 have relied on it as
the common law rule.
An analysis of the statutory law in Pennsylvania further demonstrates
that the principle of imposing costs on defendants acquitted of misdemeanors has not been entirely consistent. The earliest statute was the
Act of 17916 entitled "A Supplement to the Penal Laws of this State,"
which declared, inter alia, ".

.

. where any person shall be brought before

a court . .. on the charge of having committed a crime, and such charge,
upon examination, shall appear to be unfounded . . ." the costs should fall

on the county. There followed the Act of March 20, 17977 which declared
that if a defendant was acquitted by a petit jury of any indictable offense
the costs should be borne by the county. These two Acts demonstrate that
the legislature was determined to relieve acquitted defendants of payment
of the costs of unsuccessful prosecutions and changed the common law principle which imposed costs upon the accused, whether convicted or acquitted. s
The legislative tide turned abruptly in the Act of December 7, 1805,0
the statute under review in the Tilghman case. Its provisions were
essentially the same as the 1860 statute under controversy in the instant
case. Although its stated purpose was to discourage "unfounded prosecutions," its effect was to invalidate both the Acts of 1791 and 1797 and
restore the common law practice in Pennsylvania of imposing costs on
acquitted defendants. As a result of the Act of 1805, the words of which
were essentially incorporated again into the Act of 1860, trial judges in
misdemeanor cases have consistently used the language of Mr. Justice
Gibson in the Tilghman case in instructing juries: 10
3. Spears v. State, 64 Neb. 77, 89 N.W. 624 (1902) ; Ex parte Sykes, 46 Tex.
13 Ill. 606 (1852).
4. 4 S.&R. 126, 128 (Pa. 1818).
5. Commonwealth v. Horner, 34 Pa. 440 (1859) ; Commonwealth v. Bauder, 188
Pa. Super. 424, 145 A.2d 915 (1958).
6. 3 Laws of Pa. 37 (Smith 1810 ed.).
7. 3 Laws of Pa. 281 (Smith 1810 ed.). The preamble of which recited as its
purpose: "And whereas, by the existing laws, a party so acquitted is equally liable
to costs of prosecution as if he were convicted, which operates injustice and a punishment to the innocent. . . ." (Emphasis added.)
8. Strein v. Ziegler, I W.&S. 259, 260 (Pa. 1841).
9. 4 Laws of Pa. 204 (Smith 1810 ed.). Its preamble recited: "...
the laws
obliging the respective counties to pay the costs of prosecutions, in all criminal cases,
where the accused is or are acquitted, have a tendency to promote litigation; inasmuch
as they enable restless and turbulent people to harass the peaceable part of the community with trifling, unfounded, or malicious prosecutions at the expense of the

Crim. 51, 79 S.W. 538 (1904) ; Giles v. State, 28 Ga. 462 (1859) ; Wells v. McCullock,

public.. .

."

(Emphasis added.)

10. 4 S.&R. at 129.
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The subjecting of a defendant, who has been acquitted, to the payment of costs, at first view, may appear unjust. We attach to an
acquittal the idea of perfect innocence and it is perhaps right it should
generally be considered so. But when we reflect that by the common
law, a defendant, though acquitted, always paid costs . . . we may

view the case of a defendant acquitted of actual crime, but whose
conduct may have been reprehensible in some respects, or whose
innocence may have been doubtful, as not a very hard one when left
precisely as it was at common law. .

.

. The judgment (costs) is not

on the indictment, .but on something collateral to it. The defendant is
not punished for a matter of which he stood indicted; (for he is
acquitted of everything of that sort), though on account of something
of which he was not indicted, some impropriety of conduct, or ground
of suspicion, which the verdict of the jury has fastened on him, the
statute law refuses to interfere in his behalf, and leaves him as he
stood at the common law. .

.

. (Emphasis added.)

Just how extraordinarily unique this Pennsylvania practice is may be
demonstrated by the fact that no other American jurisdiction has authorized
by statute" or by common law 12 the imposition of costs on defendants
acquitted of misdemeanors. Furthermore, this practice is specifically condemned in the constitutions of four American states' 3 and is prohibited
14
in federal practice.
A penal statute must contain clear standards of guilt 5 in order to
satisfy the basic requirements of due process contained in the Constitutions
of the United States and of Pennsylvania. Without such standards, it is
void for vagueness.'6 However, the supreme court in the present case
held that the 1860 statute is not a penal statute since mere direction to
pay costs in a criminal proceeding is not part of the sentence but is an
"incident of the judgment." The conclusion made by the court is thus
completely opposite to that of the Tilghman case upon which so much
emphasis was placed in the first instance.' 7 The statute of 1860 provides
that when the jury shall, upon acquittal, determine that the prosecutor or
the defendant shall pay the costs, the court shall then pass sentence to
that effect. As Judge Flood of the superior court so aptly noted in his
11. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 278, § 14 (1956) ; MICH. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 28.1057
(1948) ; N.Y. CODt OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURS § 719; OHIO Rv. CODx ANN. § 2947.23
(1953) ; VA. CODE § 19.320 (1960) ; WASH. REv. CODe ANN. tit. 10, § 10.46.200 (1881).
12. See cases cited note 3 supra.
13. FLA. CONST., Declaration of Rights § 14; GA. CONST. art. I, Bill of Rights
§ I, para. X; MISS. CONST. art. 14, § 261; N.C. CONST. art. I, Declaration of Rights
§ 11.
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1918 (1948).
15. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; PA. CONST. art. 1, § 9.

16. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939) ; Commonwealth v. Franklin,
172 Pa. Super. 152, 92 A.2d 272 (1952) ; City of Chester v. Elam, 408 Pa. 350, 184
A.2d 257 (1962).
17. 4 S.&R. at 129. Mr. Justice Gibson stated: "I grant that a statute imposing
costs is penal in its nature, and must be strictly construed ..
" (Emphasis added.) ;
Commonwealth v. Harkness, 4 Binn. 193 (Pa. 1811) ; Clemens v. Commonwealth, 7
Watts 485 (Pa. 1838).
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dissenting opinion,18 which was concurred in by Mr. Justice Cohen of
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court:
The sentence as to an acquitted defendant can only be that he pay
the costs. This is the actual judgment and not an incident to the
judgment. The cases holding that the imposition of costs is an incident
to a judgment of sentence upon a guilty verdict lend no support to the
proposition that the imposition of costs on an acquitted defendant is
something other than punishment. (Emphasis added.)
The clear import of the court's upholding of the costs statute is that
a person may be imprisoned without having been convicted of a crime
and even after having been acquitted by a jury of the only crime of which
he has been charged. The court attempts to offset this harsh result by
saying that if a defendant is unable to pay the costs he could declare himself
insolvent and thereby avoid any actual imprisonment. Nevertheless, the
fact remains that an acquitted defendant may be imprisoned if he is unable
to prove insolvency. This is clearly punitive' 9 in nature and as such it
must meet the basic requirements of due process before a defendant could
be deprived of his property or indeed his liberty. Whether the "reprehensible conduct" which is punishable by the imposition of costs is so vague
that it must be condemned as being repugnant to the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment may be easily determined by an analysis of
some of the more recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States and of the appellate courts of Pennsylvania.
In Lanzetta v. New Jersey,20 the United States Supreme Court held
that the use of the term "gangster" in a penal statute was so vague as to
be repugnant to the fourteenth amendment. The court stated that: "No
one may be required at peril of life, liberty, or property to speculate as
to the meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to what
the State commands or forbids."' 21 In City of Chester v. Elan, 22 the

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the phrase "disorderly conduct"
was unconstitutionally vague under both the federal and state constitutions.
The court followed the reasoning of the Lanzetta case to the effect that "a
statute that either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague
that the ordinary man must guess as to its meaning and differ as to its
'23
application, lacks the first essential of due process of law."
18. Commonwealth v. Giaccio, 202 Pa. Super. 294, 312, 196 A.2d 189, 198 (1963).
19. State r. Cowen, 231 Iowa 1117, 3 N.W.2d 176 (1942), held that in order to
constitute a "punishment" or "penalty" there must be a deprivation of property or
some right, such as the enjoyment of liberty. In United States v. Reisinger, the
Court considered the terms "penalty," "liability," and "forfeiture" to be synonymous
with "punishment" in criminal prosecutions. 128 U.S. 398 (1888).
20. 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
21. Id. at 453.

22. 408 Pa. 350, 184 A.2d 257 (1962). As Mr. Justice Cohen stated at 356, 184

A.2d at 260: "In order to comply with the due process clause of both the Pennsylvania
Constitution and the Constitution of the United States, a criminal statute must be
sufficiently certain and definite to inform the accused of the acts which the statute
is intended to prohibit and which will render them liable to its penalties." (Emphasis
added.)
23. Id. at 356, 184 A.2d at 260.
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The case of Commonwealth v. Franklin,24 which was decided by the
Pennsylvania Superior Court, is similar to the present case in many respects
and yet different results were reached. In that case, acquitted defendants
who were determined to be "not of good fame" under an ancient English
statute then in effect in Pennsylvania were required to post peace bonds
and were subject to imprisonment if they were unable to supply the required
security. The superior court held that "not of good fame" was unconstitutionally vague and that the practice was contrary to our fundamental law
and against an enlightened sense of justice.2 5 Yet eleven years later, the
same court was unable to find any relationship between the Franklin andGiaccio cases because in the former the statute was of English origin and
not approved by the legislature and in the latter case the statute has been
26
enacted by the state legislature.
The supreme court in the present case relied on Wright v. Commonwealth27 as having previously upheld the constitutionality of the costs
statute. Although Wright was decided a few years after the ratification
of the fourteenth amendment, it cannot be said to have considered the
statute in light of the amendment since the per curiam opinion followed the
rule announced in the Tilghman case with no reference at all to its constitutionality. Thus, until the present case was decided, the statute had never
been constitutionally examined.
Another important issue discussed by the court was whether the statute
was an improper delegation of legislative authority to the jury in violation
of the Pennsylvania Constitution.2 8 To satisfy the constitutional requirements, a jury in reaching its verdict must have independent standards
of guilt with which to compare the defendant's conduct. It should never
be permitted to determine a defendant's guilt or innocence solely on the
29
basis of individual feeling towards him. In Kellerman v. Philadelphia,
the following principle was enunciated: ".

.

. any legislative enactment

which vests in a person or body of persons free of any standard, independent of his or their own mind and judgment the power of supplying,
or giving force to, or suspending its terms . . . is unconstitutional. .... ,,30
The court placed great emphasis upon Locke's AppealP' to uphold the
constitutionality of the 1860 statute. However, it is submitted that the
Franklin case would also be equally applicable in this situation since the
alternative basis for the holding in Franklin was the statute's contravention
24. 172 Pa. Super. 152, 92 A.2d 272 (1952).

25. Id. at 156, 92 A.2d at 275.
26. 202 Pa. Super. at 303, 196 A.2d at 194.
27. 77 Pa. 470 (1870).
28. PA. CONST. art. III, § 1.
29. 139 Pa. Super. 569, 13 A.2d 84 (1939).
30. Id. at 575, 13 A.2d at 86.
31. 72 Pa. 491, 498, 499 (1872). In one of the most often quoted judicial statements originated by a Pennsylvania jurist, Mr. Justice Agnew stated: "The Legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law but it can make a law to delegate some
fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own
action depend."

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1964

11

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1964], Art. 9
FALL

1964]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

of article III, section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution as an improper
82
delegation of legislative power to the judiciary.
Due process must not be considered to be a static body of rules.
Recent constitutional developments83 have resulted in the advancement of
the standards of "fundamental fairness." Today higher standards of fairness are demanded than were required one hundred years ago when the
costs statute was reenacted. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter once said:
Due process of law thus conveys neither formal nor fixed nor
It is of the very nature of a free society to
advance in its standards, of what is deemed reasonable and right.
Representing, as it does a living principle, due process is not confined
within a permanent catalogue of what may at a given
time be deemed
34
the limits or the essentials of fundamental rights.
narrow requirements ....

The Giaccio court held that procedural due process was not violated
because the defendant had tlie opportunity to be heard on the question of
costs during the trial on the substantive offenses. However, Judge Flood
of the superior court in his dissenting opinion s8 raised several questions
as to the defendant's opportunity to be heard on that question. Of course,
the defendant may appeal from an arbitrary verdict by the jury in imposing
costs on him, but the fact remains that he has no reasonable opportunity
to defend himself on the issue of costs before the jury retires, and this
constitutes a denial of due process.8 6 Further, since the statute does not
require proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the misconduct which underlies
87
the imposition of the costs, it contravenes procedural due process.
Finally the court held that there was no violation of the equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. Yet only a
defendant acquitted of a misdemeanor may be assessed the costs of prosecutions because statutes expressly prohibit imposing costs on a defendant
found innocent in a summary proceeding s or on a defendant acquitted
32. 172 Pa. Super. 152, 92 A.2d 272 (1952). The court stated at 184, 92 A.2d
288: ". . . the legislature has no right to confer or the judiciary to accept a power
in terms so broad and meaning so vague that the application or non-application of the
law depends wholly upon the individual opinion and predilections of the trial judge.
Any statute which makes the judge's discretion the only rule for his conduct must
be regarded as invalid."
33. Jackson v. Denno, 84 Sup. Ct. 1774 (1964); Bouie v. City of Columbia, 84
Sup. Ct. 1697 (1964) ; Baggett v. Bullitt, 84 Sup. Ct. 1316 (1964) ; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) ; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
34. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
35. 202 Pa. Super, at 316, 196 A.2d at 200. "Is the district attorney to be permitted to discuss 'reprehensible conduct' other than the crime charged, and is his
counsel thus going to be compelled to scatter his defence so as to meet this indefinite
charge as well as the crime for which he is indicted? Is the district attorney to be
permitted to tell the jury that they may impose costs even if they have a reasonable
doubt of his guilt ?"
36. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948). As Mr. Justice Black stated at 273:
"A person's right to reasonable notice of a charge against him, and an opportunity to
be heard in his defense - a right to his day in court - are basic in our system of
jurisprudence; and these rights include as a minimum, a right to examine the witnesses against him, to offer testimony, and to be represented by counsel."
37. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
38. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1221 (1791).
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of a felony. 9 The court attempted to explain that felony prosecutions are
of such public importance that the government is willing to bear the costs
and that as for summary offenses there is no jury to impose costs. Classification is, of course, a task exclusively for the legislature and unless it is
patently arbitrary and utterly lacking in rational justification it must be
permitted to stand. 40 But the distinction in this case appears to have no
rational basis at all. A misdemeanor and a felony both involve improper
conduct of different degrees. Yet the legislature provides a penalty for a
defendant accused but acquitted of the less serious degree of improper
conduct and provides immunity for the defendant accused but acquitted of
the more serious degree. This, it would seem, results in an unreasonable
classification and a denial of the equal protection of the laws. 41 Mr.
justice Holmes once said ".

..

the law does all that is needed when it does

all that it can, indicates a policy, applies it to all within the lines, and seeks
to bring within the lines all similarly situated so far and so fast as its
means allow."'42 It is submitted that this law has done far less than it could
have done and the result is to deny a person, innocent in the eyes of the
law, the equal protection of those laws.
One of the most famous and perhaps the most often quoted definition
of due process of law is that of Daniel Webster in his argument in the
Dartmouth College case 43 in which he declared that by due process of law
is meant "a law which hears before it condemns; which proceeds upon
inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial."44 An appeal is presently
being made to the Supreme Court of the United States. 45 As the constitutional issues are reviewed, it is to be hoped that the final resolution of this
case will return to the courts of Pennsylvania their "enlightened sense of
justice."
Thomas J. Tomalis

CONSTITUTIONAL
RESTRICTING

LAW-POLITICAL ACTIVITY-COUNTY

COUNTY

EMPLOYEES'

POLITICAL

ACTIVITY

CHARTER
VIOLATES

FIRST AMENDMENT.

Fort v. Civil Serv. Comm'n (Calif. 1964)
In April of 1962, the appellee, a civil service employee of Alameda

County, California, served as chairman of a speaker's bureau for the
39. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1223 (1860).
40. Milk Control Comm'n v. Battista, 413 Pa. 652, 198 A.2d 840 (1964).
41. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
42. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
43. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 517 (1819).
44. 12 AM. JUR. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 573 (1938).
45. According to defendant's counsel, Notice of Appeal to the United States
Supreme Court has been filed and a Jurisdictional Statement is now in preparation.
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Contra Costa committee to re-elect Governor Brown. His total activity
consisted of six hours of his own time. In June of that year, he was discharged by the board of supervisors for having violated section 41 of the
county charter, which restrict the political activities of county employees.'
The decision of the board was affirmed by the county civil service commission. Fort began proceedings in the Superior Court of California for a
writ of mandamus to require reinstatement. The court declared section 41
unconstitutional and ordered Fort reinstated. The commission appealed
this decision. The Supreme Court of California affirmed on the grounds
that the charter restrictions were an unreasonable violation of state and
federal constitutionally protected freedoms of speech and political expression and association. While the court recognized that first amendment
freedoms are not absolutes, it stated that any restrictions on them must be
drawn with narrow specificity and even then only for the most compelling
reasons. This provision was, in the opinion of the court, too broad and too
vague to be reasonable in relation to the need for which it was enacted.
Fort v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 38 Cal. Rptr. 625, 392 P.2d 385 (1964).
This decision is both sound and in accord with judicial determinations
in other areas. At a time when the courts are hesitant to restrict any
first amendment freedoms, 2 legislation such as involved in the instant case
stands out as a glaring anachronism. Yet similar legislation exists today
on all levels of government, 3 the most prominent being the Federal Political
Activity Act 4 (Hatch Act), which prohibits federal officers and employees
taking any active part in political management or in political campaigns.
The constitutionality of the Hatch Act ", was upheld by a four-to-three
decision in United Public Workers of America (C.I.O.) v. Mitchell.6
To reconcile the decision in Fort with Mitchell, the California court dis1. ALAMEDA,

CALIF., CHARTER

§ 41, provides:

No officer or employee of the County in the classified civil service shall
directly or indirectly make, solicit or receive, or be in any manner concerned in
making, soliciting or receiving any assessment, subscription, or contribution for
any political party or any political purpose whatsoever. No person holding a
position in the classified civil service shall take any part in political management
or affairs in any political campaign or election, or in any campaign to adopt or
reject any initiative or referendum measure other than to cast his vote or to
privately express his opinion. Any employee violating the provisions of this
section may be removed from office.
2. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) ; Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398 (1963).
3. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 741.904 (1963).
4. "The act was passed in two installments, 53 Stat. 1147 (1939) and 54 Stat.
767 (1940), which are combined in 5 U.S.C. §§ 118i-n (1958). Section 9(a) of the
act, 53 Stat. 1148 (1939), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 118i(a) (1958), covers federal
employees; section 12(a), 54 Stat. 767 (1940), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 118k(a)
(1958), covers state and local governmental employees whose principal employment
is in federally financed activities." Rose, A CriticalLook at the Hatch Act, 75 HARV.
L. REv. 510 n.1 (1962).
5. The section of the act under attack was § 9(a). The constitutionality of
§ 12(a) was upheld by the Court on the same day in State v. United States Civil
Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947).
6. 330 U.S. 75 (1947). Mr. Justice Reed delivered the majority opinion. Justices
Douglas and Black delivered dissenting opinions, with Justice Rutledge concurring
in Justice Black's dissent. Justices Murphy and Jackson took no part in the decision.
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tinguished the Alameda County charter provision from Hatch on two
grounds. First, the court noted that the charter provision is much broader
in scope than Hatch since it prohibits nonpartisan as well as partisan
political activity, while Hatch refers only to partisan political activity.
Secondly, the charter provision, unlike Hatch, is vague and uncertain as to
just what type of activity is prohibited. The dissenters in Mitchell used the
same reasons for urging the unconstitutionality of Hatch as the California
court used for holding the charter provision unconstitutional, namely that
the legislation is too broad and too vague to be reasonable in relation to
the need for which itwas enacted.
A study of the Hatch Act, its scope, its need, and its results, lend
support to the belief that its constitutionality should not have been upheld
because it is "one of the most significant abridgments of the constitutional
rights of public employees that the courts have sustained ... "
Restrictions on the political activities of government employees were
imposed in this country long before the passage of the Hatch Act. In
1801, Thomas Jefferson issued a warning to his federal employees that it
was not their proper function to try to influence elections. In 1841,
President Harrison repeated this warning. Finally, in 1883, the Civil
Service Act was passed and twenty-four years later, President Theodore
Roosevelt issued an Executive Order restricting the political activity of
civil servants.8 This order became part of the Civil Service Rules and
under' it the Commission decided on a case-by-case method just what
activities were prohibited to federal employees. 9 In 1939, the Hatch Act
incorporated this order (dropping the word "privately") and extended
its provisions to all federal employees and not just classified civil servants.' 0
In 1940, its coverage was extended to state and local government employees
whose employment is in part federally financed." Section 15 was adopted
to define the outlawed activity as:
...the same activities ...as the United States Civil Service Commission has heretofore determined are at the time this section takes
effect prohibited on the part of employees of the classified civil service
of the United States by the provisions of the civil service rules prohibiting such employees from taking any active part in political man12
agement or in political campaigns.
Thus the Commission's case law was incorporated into the statute.'8
7. Nelson, Public Employees and the Right to Engage in Political Activity,
9 VAND. L. REv. 27, 33 (1955).
8. Executive Order No. 642 of June 3, 1907 read: "Persons who by the provisions of these rules are in the competitive classified service, while retaining the
right to vote as they please and to express privately their political opinions on all
political subjects, shall take no active part in political management or in political
campaigns." Esman, The Hatch Act - A Reappraisal,60 YALg L.J. 986, 988 (1951).
9. Ibid.
10. § 9(a), 53 Stat. 1148 (1939), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 118i(a) (1958).
11. § 12(a), 54 Stat. 767 (1940), as amended,5 U.S.C. § 118k(a) (1958).
12. § 15, 54 Stat. 771 (1940), as amended,5 U.S.C. § 1181 (1958).
13. The types of activities that the Commission has generally held prohibited are:
(1) Participation, except as a spectator, in political conventions. (2) Active
participation, including speaking, in party primary meetings or caucuses. (3)
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In 1947, Hatch was challenged by the United Public Workers of
America Union in a suit for an injunction against the enforcement of
14
section 9(a) and for a declaratory judgment as to its constitutionality.
Specifically, the act was attacked as a violation of the first amendment
freedoms of speech, press, and assembly, and the right to engage in political
activity as guaranteed by the ninth and tenth amendments.
In reaching its decision, the Court used as a constitutional guide the
"rational basis" test which presumes the validity of legislation so long as
any reasonable justification can be found by the Court. 15 The Court,
recognizing the right of Congress to control the activities of government
employees and that the responsibility for providing an efficient public
service lies with Congress, gave deference to legislative judgment in this
matter and refused to question it. The majority found precedent for their
decision in Ex parte Curtis,'0 a case in which an early statute prohibiting
certain political activity of certain government employees was upheld. 17
The majority stressed the fact that since Hatch prohibited only partisan
political activity there was a wide range of political activity still open to
the government worker in the nonpartisan realm.
While most statutes come before the Court with a presumption of
validity, such is not the case with legislation affecting first amendment
freedoms.' 8 First amendment freedoms are held on a much higher level
than others and, therefore, ". . any attempt to restrict those liberties
must be justified by clear public interest, threatened not doubtfully or
remotely, but by clear and present danger.... Only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests give occasion for permissible limitations."' 9
Organizing, conducting, or addressing a public political meeting or participating
in a political parade.

(4) Holding the office of political committeeman.

(5)

Organizing, holding office in, or addressing a political club or committee thereof.
(6) Soliciting, receiving, or otherwise handling political funds. (7) Distributing
campaign literature. (8) Publishing or contributing to a partisan newspaper or
publishing any letter or article for or against a party candidate or faction. (9) Any
activity at the polls except voting. (10) Initiating or circulating nominating
petitions. (11) Running for public office. (12) '[E]mployees are forbidden to
become prominently identified with any political movement, party, or faction, or
with the success or failure of any candidate.'
Employees are permitted to:
(1) Vote. (2) Contribute to campaign funds (but not in a Federal building
or to another Federal employee). (3) Join political organizations. (4) Attend
political meetings. (5) Participate actively in civic associations or civic betterment groups. (6) Sign petitions. (7) Wear badges (but not at work). (8)
Speak or write publicly on political subjects so long as they are not connected
with political campaigns. Esman, supra note 8, at 990-91.
14. The Court held that only one of the appellants presented matters appropriate
for judicial determination since he had already violated the Hatch Act and had been
discharged by the Commission.
15. Heady, American Government and Politics: The Hatch Act Decisions, 41
AM. POL. ScI. REv. 687, 690 (1947).
16. 106 U.S. 371 (1882).
17. That statute, however, was limited to a particular activity - the exchange
of money between federal employees for political purposes. It was narrowly drawn
to meet a specific evil very unlike the broad prohibitions of the Hatch Act. Nelson,
supra note 7, at 37.
18. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95-96 (1940) ; Schneider v. State, 308
U.S. 147, 161 (1939).
19. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945). Accord, Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol10/iss1/9

16

Donnelly: Constitutional Law - Freedom of Religion - Blood Transfusions May
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 10

This "clear and present danger" test was employed by the dissenting
Justices in Mitchell. In Justice Black's words: "Certainly laws which
restrict the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment should be narrowly drawn to meet the evil aimed at and to affect only the minimum
number of people imperatively
necessary to prevent a grave and imminent
20
public."
the
to
danger
According to the dissenting opinion the restrictions placed on government employees by the Hatch Act are much too broad to meet the evils
which Hatch was designed to eliminate. Justice Black points out that
while only partisan activity is prohibited, this is not as much of an allowance as it may seem since most causes and candidates of any significance
are espoused by political parties. Under the Hatch Act an employee would
be free to take an active part in civic groups while he would not have the
same freedom under the charter provision involved in Fort. However,
once that group switches into the political realm, as it may well do, he
would have to disassociate himself. The federal employee is therefore left
with the burden of deciding for himself when the group has become
sufficiently partisan to come under the Hatch Act prohibition. If he is
wrong, he could be discharged. This uncertainty and consequent insecurity, which the civil service movement is supposed to eliminate, could
well result in many civil servants being kept out of important civic affairs.
The prohibitions of Hatch not only apply to government employees, but,
may indirectly apply to members of the civil servant's family. The Civil
Service Commission has warned that a government employee can be held
responsible for the partisan political activity of members of his family if the
21
Commission finds that such activity is an attempt to evade the Hatch Act.
The result is lack of political activity by those outside the service because
of the uncertainty as to what the Commission may find to be their intention.
The court in Fort maintains that the Hatch Act is not vague and
uncertain in what is prohibited as is the charter provision of Alameda
County. The prohibited political activity is that which the Commission
had decided was prohibited at the time the act was passed. Theoretically,
every government employee should read Pamphlet 2022 and also consider
any pertinent case law that is not included in that publication. Practically,
this is quite a burdensome task to expect of a roller in the Philadelphia
mint or of a file clerk in a New York District Internal Revenue Office.
The result of this vagueness is that the civil servant does not clearly
23
understand the scope of permissible activities.
20. United Public Workers of America (C.I.O.) v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75,
110 (1947).
21. Id. at 108.
22. Pamphlet 20 is a pamphlet published by the Civil Service Commission which
contains the decisions of the Commission. It is an incomplete report. Rose, supra
note 4, at 511.
23. "A most unfortunate result of the present vagueness of the act is that because
doubt as to the permissibility of a kind of political activity continues, an inestimable
quantum of voluntary and desirable political participation goes undone, though it may
be determined at a later date that such acts are permissible." Id. at 526.
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The effect of the Hatch Act and similar state and local legislation is
to deprive millions of citizens, as a class, of constitutional rights enjoyed
by other citizens, to discourage from entering government service many
talented individuals whose service could benefit the country, to foster civic
apathy and inertia on the part of many civil servants who are afraid to do
anything lest they violate the law and place their jobs in jeopardy, and
consequently, to deprive the nation of the contributions that could be made
by government employees who ".

.

. as a group are among the highest in

'24
education, civic consciousness, and information on public affairs.
The civil service movement was designed to replace the spoils system
as a way to staff the government and to provide the country with an
efficient and loyal government service. To accomplish this, Congress has
tried by legislation to eliminate political friction between superiors and
subordinates, to remove political considerations from employment, to promote harmony and cooperation by eliminating the possibility of having
employees actively campaigning against their employer and his policies, and
to relieve the employee from political pressure by his superiors to contribute
time and money to political campaigns and to pledge support at the polls
for the p~trty in power. These are the evils with which the Hatch Act
was meant to deal. The question is not the validity of eliminating them
from government service, but whether or not legislation as broad and
comprehensive as the Hatch Act, which results in the political sterilization
of millions of government workers, is the most workable solution.
There are specific evils to be eliminated and legislation can be enacted
to deal specifically with them.2 5 Congress might, for instance, enact a
federal code of corrupt political practices for the civil service and thus
pinpoint and legislate against the specific activities that are undersirable
rather than paint with a broad brush a stroke that covers desirable as well
as undesirable activities. Legislation should also be designed to apply
restrictions selectively to different types of employees so that the "...
stringency of such restrictions [will] vary with the employee's governmental function, his contact with the general public, the degree of his job
security or other factors. ' 26 It is interesting to observe that in England,
from whom we borrowed the idea of a politically neutral civil service, the
trend has been toward selective restrictions which vary according to the

nature of the work and its relation to the public. 2 7 Justice Douglas, in his

dissent in Mitchell, called for a distinction between administrative 'and
industrial employees when applying restrictions on political activity.
The decision in the Mitchell case has been the basis for much state and
local legislation of the same nature, and as the number of government
24. Esman. supra note 8, 992-93.
25. E.g., MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 43, § 108 (1961) (specifically prohibits political
contributions by city employees); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24/, §§ 38e-381 (prohibits
specific corrupt political practices) and § 38t (limits political activity during working
hours) (1963).
26. Rose, supra note 4, at 526.
27. Nelson, supra note 7, at 48.
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employees increases at all levels 28 the number of people being deprived of
their constitutional rights increases. This is happening while courts and
legislatures are moving forward in securing the political and civil constitutional rights of their citizens in other areas. At such a time the unanimous
decision by the California Supreme Court in the Fort case should focus
attention on the need for a re-evaluation of this politically restrictive
legislation and particularly the Hatch Act. The validity of such legislation
should again be questioned by weighing the country's need for what it
provides with the country's need to secure for all its citizens their first
amendment freedoms, the exercise of which lies ". . . at the foundation of
free government by free men."'29 If this is done, Fort might well presage a
change in the thinking of both courts and legislatures as regards politically
restrictive legislation.
Dolores B. Sesso

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -

PUBLIC FUNDS TO BE USED By POLITICAL
PARTIES TO HELP DEFRAY CAMPAIGN COSTS HELD NOT TO BE FOR A
PUBLIC PURPOSE.

Opinion of the Justices (Mass. 1964)
The House of Representatives of Massachusetts submitted two questions to the Supreme Judicial Court concerning the constitutionality of
a proposed piece of legislation' which would have permitted tax money
to be used to finance the political campaigns in the next biennial state
election. The major question considered was whether or not the monies
appropriated and disbursed by the authority of this bill would be for a
public purpose. The court, with one dissent, answered this question in
28. The number of civilians employed by the Federal Government as of March,
1964 totaled 2,490,000. (This figure does not include those employed in the Central
Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency.) The civilian employment
of the state and local governments as of October, 1963 totaled 7,188,000. The total
labor force of the United States as of March, 1964 totaled 75,533,000. This means
that (allowing for an increase on the state and local level between October, 1963 and
March, 1964) approximately one out of every seven workers is a public employee.
These figures are taken from STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OP THE UNITED STATES 1964,
85TH ANNUAL EDITION at pages 405, 435 and 217, respectively.
29. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939).
1. H.R. Res. 1482, 1964 Sess.:
There is hereby appropriated from the General Fund the sum of Two hundred
thousand dollars which shall be paid over to the state committee of each political
party in that proportion which the vote cast by each such party in the last state
primary bore to the total vote cast therein. Funds so paid shall be used to defray
in part the cost of the political campaigns of each such party for the next biennial
state election on behalf of candidates to be voted for by all the voters of the commonwealth.
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the negative holding that, since the officers of the state political committees
are not public officials and are responsible only to their own organizations,
it would be improper for such officers to have access to public monies which
could be put to their own private use. Opinion of the Justices, 197 N.E.2d
691 (Mass. 1964).
The test as to whether or not public funds are being used for a public
purpose is "whether or not the expenditure confers a direct public benefit
of a reasonably general character, that is to say, to a significant part of the
public, as distinguished from a remote and theoretical benefit."'2 The
majority cites this test with approval but departs from it in replying to the
question. Instead of seeking an answer to the question in the light of this
test, it seizes upon the fact that the officers of the state committees of the
political parties are not public officials and for that reason concludes that
any money given to these committees would not be for a public purpose.
In reaching this conclusion it relies upon two previous Massachusetts
opinions, each of which serves a different part of the majority's argument.
The first case, Attorney General v. Drohan,3 held that a quo warranto
information by the Attorney General on behalf of a relator who was an
officer of a political committee was improper since the Attorney General
can intervene in such matters only insofar as they relate to public offices.
The court then defined "public office" as "one whose duties are in their
nature public; that is, involving in their performance the exercise of some
portion of the sovereign power. . .. -4 The second case was an advisory
opinion5 which held that it would be improper for a commission, the
majority of whose members were not public officials, to receive and expend
public funds because these officials were accountable solely to their own
organizations and had no connection with any branch of the government.
Thus, the majority reasoning embraces two propositions: (1) the officers
of state political committees are not public officials, and (2) therefore public
funds given to them would not be for a public purpose.
The dissent in the instant case agrees with the majority that officers
of state political committees are not public officials. However, it disagrees
with the conclusion that for this reason, the. funds so disbursed would not
be for a public purpose. Citing many examples 6 of enterprises which
greatly benefit individuals and which, at the same time, are highly beneficial
to the public, it argues that if the public interest to be served by the
proposed bill is great enough, the fact that individuals who are not public
officials will be benefited should be of little concern.
The dissent finds sufficient public interest in the present case. "It
seems

. . .that a rational purpose to be attributed to this bill is that of

2. Opinion of the Justices, 337 Mass. 777, 781, 150 N.E.2d 693, 696 (1958).
3. 169 Mass. 534, 48 N.E. 279 (1897).
4. Id. at 535, 48 N.E. at 281.
5. Opinion of the Justices, 337 Mass. 777, 150 N.E.2d 693 (1958).
6. Freeland v. Hastings, 10 Allen 570 (Mass. 1865) ; Talbot v. Hudson, 16 Gray
417 (Mass. 1860) ; Hazen v. Essex Co., 12 Cush. 475 (Mass. 1853) ; Boston & Roxberry Mill-Dam Corp. v. Newman, 12 Pick. 467 (Mass. 1832).
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enabling candidates of modest means to seek State wide public office;
conceivably its ultimate purpose is to improve the calibre of persons holding
office by enabling them to be chosen from a broader section of the population. ' 7 It is difficult to imagine a purpose more public.
Legislative attempts to use tax monies to help finance political campaigns are quite new in the United States. In 1961 the Federal Fair
Election Finance Act s was proposed in the United States Senate but was
never reported out of committee. Concerned only with federal elections,
this bill proposed: (1) federal payment of one-half the cost of radio and
television broadcast expenses for participating candidates; 9 (2) federal
payment of general campaign expenses not to exceed five cents multiplied
by the recent average vote for the contested office;10 (3) postage free
envelopes ;al and (4) a federal income tax credit, not to exceed ten dollars,
equal to a contribution to a candidate. 12 The participating candidates would
be required to certify that funds from private sources would not exceed
the allowable maximum federal contribution13 and that no private con4
tribution from an individual would exceed $100.1

The only general proposal of this kind that has been enacted into law
is the Election Fund Law of Puerto Rico of 1957.1 This law established
a general election fund from which the principal political parties may draw
to cover legitimate campaign expenses.' 6 Payment is made directly to the
party's creditors by the Secretary of the Treasury upon bills submitted by
the party secretary and treasurer; if any bills submitted are not in accordance with the law, the party secretary and treasurer who signed such bills
are personally liable for their payment. 17 The law also sets a dollar limit
on private contributions to the local and central funds of a party in any
one year.' 8 It requires the treasurer of each party and of each municipal
committee to certify under oath to the Secretary of the Treasury at the
end of December that no contributions in excess of that allowed were
received in that year. 19 In addition, it is a felony to solicit political contribu20
tions from government employees under any circumstances.
7. 197 N.E.2d 691, 694 (1964).
8. S. 1555, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), discussed in 30 Gto. WASH. L. REv. 328,
351-55 (1962). For other general proposals see Odegard, A Primary Fee to
Finance Politics; Gunzburg, How a Non Partisan Political Fund Might Work;
Stern, A Program of Federal Contributions to Political Campaigns in CITIZENS'
RESEARCH

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

FOUNDATION,

MONEY FOR

POLITICS:

A

MISCELLANY OF

IDEAS

(1963).

S. 1555, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. § 102 (1961).
S. 1555, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. § 103 (1961).
S.1555, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. § 104 (1961).
S. 1555, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. § 401, amending INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 38.
S. 1555, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. § 105(a) (2) (1961).
S. 1555, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. § 105(a) (3) (1961).
P.R. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §§ 601-09 (1961).
P.R. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 605 (1961).
P.R. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 603 (1961).
P.R. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 607(b) (1961).
P.R. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 607(d) (1961). However, there has been a general
failure of compliance with this provision. WELLS, GOvERNMENT FINANCING OF
POLITICAL PARTIES IN PUERTO Rico (1961).
20. P.R. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 607(e).
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161.

The majority's objection to the Massachusetts proposal takes the
form of a fear of giving public monies to private individuals. However,
their objection must go deeper than this since the fear of private individuals
misusing the disbursed monies is obviated by the requirement that officers
of the political committees submit statements to the state secretary detailing
the receipt and disbursement of contributions.2 1 The underlying objection
is the failure of the bill to serve any public purpose at all. The dissent
argues that the bill will serve a public purpose because it will enable
candidates of modest means to seek office, because candidates will come
from a broader section of the population, and because the calibre of persons
holding office will be improved. In fact, however, the bill does not so
provide. The emphasis of the bill is on party participation. Individual candacies are not encouraged; and it can be safely presumed that a party would
use the funds solely to aid in the election of its own slate of candidates.
One possible public purpose of a bill like this could be to minimize
the importance of private contribution to political parties. Indeed, this was
the only reason why the Puerto Rican Legislature saw fit to enact their
election fund act.22 That political candidates be free to run for election on
their own records and, if elected, to hold office free from any private interest
is pre-eminently a public purpose. But in the instant proposal this problem
is not even recognized. If the Massachusetts proposal were enacted into
law, private contributions would continue and the same pressure would be
felt by candidates and office holders. 23 Since the Massachusetts proposal
fails to recognize and deal with this problem, it is difficult to see how a
public purpose would be served.
Thus, the majority was correct in answering the public purpose
question in the negative. But its reasoning was faulty in that it overlooked
the overriding issue. Instead of basing its answer on the fact that officers
of the state political committees were not public officials, the majority
should have come to grips with the sole question of public purpose. If the
Massachusetts Legislature would see fit to include a provision attempting
to further limit private contributions to political parties, then a clear public
purpose would be served. Then the majority's objection would be timely.
The payment of funds directly to the party is clearly objectionable. The
legislature might then also see fit to include a provision relating to proper
disbursement of the funds. It might, for example, adopt the Puerto Rican
21. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 55, § 16 (1964).
22. It is profoundly in the public interest that political parties be free from the
control of economic forces, private or governmental, which upon becoming
necessary for the financing of the normal legitimate activities of political parties,
might gain a control or influence over them that would be inimical to the democratic ideal, to the political freedom of the people in general, and to a genuine
operation of democracy. Statement of Motives, Law No. 110, 1st Regular Session
of the Third Legislature of Puerto Rico (1957).
23. It must be noted that Massachusetts law does limit private contributions to
candidates and political parties. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 55, §§ 6-7 (1964). However,
since the present proposal does not further limit these contributions, the money
received from the state would in no way help to minimize the private pressure that
is already present.
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plan for payment directly to the party's creditors. But it would have to
adopt some method by which the State could retain some control over the
use of the funds. At this point, the majority could be reasonably sure
24
that the funds would be for a public purpose.
James P. Gannon

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

-

STATUTE' CONTROLLING

ISSUANCE OF

CERTIFICATE TO TRANSACT BUSINESS AS A MEDICAL SERVICE HELD
UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR LACK OF PROPER LEGISLATIVE OBJECTIVE
AND IMPROPER DELEGATION OF POWER.

Group Health Ins. of New Jersey v. Howell (N.J. 1964)
The Group Health Insurance of New Jersey, denied a certificate
of authority to transact business as a medical service, brought action
against the Commissioner of Banking and Insurance to have certain
sections of the act upon which such denial was based declared unconstitutional.' The challenged section required fifty-one per centum participation of the physicians in a county before the commissioner could issue
a certificate authorizing a medical service corporation to transact business
in that particular county.2 The appellant contended that this provision
was not reasonably related to any proper legislative objective, and
therefore arbitrary. 3 The respondents contended that the provision served
the public purpose of insuring the availability of an adequate choice of
24. Even if all of the above objections were met a still larger constitutional
objection would have to be faced. Under Massachusetts law a candidate can be nominated by caucus without participation in a primary election. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
53, §§ 1-2 (1964). And since the proposal bases distribution of the funds on the
basis of voter participation in the state primary, it is clear that candidates of possible
third parties would not qualify to receive any of the funds. Thus, the proposal could
clearly be construed as discriminatory under the fourteenth amendment to the
Federal Constitution.
1. Medical Service Corporations Law, N.J.S.A. 17:48A-2. See Group Health
Ins. of New Jersey v. Howell, 40 N.J. 436, 193 A.2d 103 (1963), which required that
the Medical Society approve of Service Plan's trustees.
The instant case is a continuation of the original action in which part of one
section was declared unconstitutional. The present issue was remanded to the commissioner for additional affidavits and testimony and then returned to the supreme court.
2. Medical Service Corporations Law, N.J.S.A. 17:48A-3, which reads in the
pertinent part:
The certificate of authority issued by the commissioner shall specify the
county or counties in which the corporation may conduct its business. Such
certificate may be amended from time to time to include additional counties on
the basis of qualification pursuant to the provisions of this act. No such certificate
shall be issued to authorize a corporation to transact business in any county, or
if issued, the authority with respect to such county shall be cancelled by the commissioner, if he shall find that less than fifty-one per centum (51%) of the
eligible physicians in any county are participating physicians.
3. The purpose of the legislation was to provide an adequate number of physicians
for the subscribers to the plan.
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participating physicians in those areas of the State wherein services
might be sought by subscribers. The Supreme Court of New Jersey,
holding it invalid under both the Federal 4 and State5 Constitutions,
based its decision on the failure of the provision to relate to any proper
legislative objective and indicated that the challenged provision constituted an improper delegation of legislative licensing power to private
persons. 6 Group Health Ins. of New Jersey v. Howell., 43 N.J. 104, 202
A. 2d 689 (1964).
The state has the power, by virtue of its sovereignty, to regulate
and prescribe the conditions on which an insurance business may be
carried on; but it may not discriminate between citizens of equal
standing.7 There must be uniformity of application in accordance with
standards to be set by the legislature. Such regulation must be completely
within reasonable limitations.8 In determining the reasonableness of the
statutory requirements, it is necessary to consider the legislature's intention. 9 The act must be justly and reasonably necessary for the protection of the public health, safety, or welfare.' 0 The delegation of
police power to either an administrative officer or to a private group
must be based on reason as distinct from being arbitrary or capricious;
it is the duty of the court to see whether it is adapted to the end
intended."
Improper delegation of power is commonly seen in "local option"
and "consent statutes."'1 2 In local option cases, the problem may be
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
5. N.J. CONST. art. I, par. 1, and art. IV, § 1, par. 1, which read, respectively:
All persons are by nature free and independent, and have certain natural and
unalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and
liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and of pursuing and
obtaining safety and happiness.
The legislative power shall be vested in a Senate and General Assembly.

6. Note, The State Courts and Delegation of Public Authority to Private Groups,

67 HARV. L. Rzv. 1398 (1954).
The term "due process" means whether the legislation which commits these
substantial powers to private hands is reasonable.
7. State v. Stone, 118 Mo. 388, 24 S.W. 164 (1893).
8. Chicagoland Agencies, Inc. v. Palmer, 364 Ill.
13, 2 N.E.2d 910 (1936);
Fairmont Inv. Co., Inc. v. Woermann, 357 Mo. 634, 210 S.W.2d 26 (1948).
9. Nebbia v. State, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1933). The court stated:
And the guaranty of due process, as has often been held demands only that
the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, and that the means
selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be
attained.
10. Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Dept. of Pub. Util., 14 N.J. 411, 102 A.2d 618,
631 (1954).
11. People v. Griswold, 213 N.Y. 92, 106 N.E. 929, 931 (1914). The court stated:
Legislation passed in exercise of the police power must be reasonable in the
sense that it must be based on reason as distinct from being wholly arbitrary or
capricious, but when the'Legislature has power to legislate on a subject, the courts
may only look into its enactment far enough to see whether it is in any view
adapted to the end intended.
12. Note, 37 CoLuM. L. Rsv. 447, 453 (1937).
The absence of a standard also constituted an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative function. Local option laws are set before the electors of small political
areas and deal with matters of purely local concern. A statute providing for referendum is necessary on the state level. See State ex rel. McLeod v. Harvey, 170 So.
153 (Fla. 1936).
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avoided by delegating the power to substantially all persons who will be
affected. 13 In the zoning cases which delegate to a certain percentage
of property owners the power to make exceptions concerning use or
activity of property, the courts have found the lack of a rule or standard
to check 14 such acts sufficient to declare the statute repugnant to the due
process clause.' 5 Often the delegation is exercised for the protection of
some interest of the delegate. Private groups should not be "given
this power to restrict the activities of either its members or outsiders
where that power may be exercised arbitrarily and without adequate
procedural safeguards,"' 6 since private exercise of public powers may be
peculiarly subject to abuse.' It has been stated:
The learned professions might be trusted in the majority of
cases to regulate practice on the principles of expertness, though
here judgment will be subtly corroded by prejudice of various
sorts aroused into action by the will to monopolize....
Almost
any imaginable group given extensive 8powers may oppress the
minority group and exploit other groups.
The leading case' 9 with respect to the unconstitutional delegation
of legislative powers to a private group involved the Bituminous Coal
Conservation Act of 193520 which provided for negotiation between the
producers of two-thirds the national tonnage production for the preceding
year and representatives of more than one-half the mine workers employed, to set minimum work days and wages for the entire coal industry.
It was declared unconstitutional and described as "legislative delegation
in its most obnoxious form; for it is not even delegation to an official
or an official body, presumptively disinterested.'2
13. Ibid.
14. Id. at 451.
15. Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 121,
122 (1928).

16. Note, The State Courts and Delegation of Public Authority to Private Groups,

67 HARV. L. Rnv. 1398, 1408 (1954).
More often, the rule operates as a limitation on the creation of private powers
to be exercised for the protection of some interest of the delegate. And even
where the legislative recognition of private interests is considered reasonable, a
private group ought not to be given a power to restrict the activities of either
its members or of outsiders where that power may be exercised arbitrarily and
without adequate procedural safeguards. Thus, the rule against delegation may
be regarded primarily as an extension of the constitutional principle of due process.
17. Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HARV. L. Rnv. 201, 249 (1938).
18. Id. at 249, 251.
19. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
20. Bituminous Coal Conservation Act (Guffey Coal Bill), 49 Stat. 991 (1935),
15 U.S.C. §§ 801-27 (Supp. I 1936). Repealed April 26, 1937.
21. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936). Mr. Justice Sutherland stated:
The difference between producing coal and regulating its production is, of
course, fundamental. The former is a private activity; the latter is necessarily
a governmental function, since, in the very nature of things, one person may not
be entrusted with the power to regulate the business of another, and especially
of a competitor. . . . The delegation is so clearly arbitrary, and so clearly a
denial of rights safeguarded by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment,
that it is unnecessary to do more than refer to decisions of this court. . ..
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The finding of a lack of a reasonable relationship in Group Health
Ins. of New Jersey v. Howell is supported by several factors. First,
the patient-to-physician ratio varies greatly from county to county.2 2 As
a result, the fifty-one per centum, or any other per centum, requirement for the state as a whole cannot assure a uniform standard throughout the state. A solution to this problem might possibly be to set a
specified patient-to-physician ratio as the minimal physician participation
required for a medical service to transact business; in this way uniformity
of medical service throughout the state might be achieved. Second, the
requirement does not assure that the majority of physicians will necessarily
constitute the working majority with respect to a medical service plan.
The American Medical Association estimates that twelve per centum
of all licensed physicians are not actively engaged in the practice of
medicine. In this situation improper delegation could occur since those
physicians whose participation in the plan is not reasonably required
will be given the power to accept or reject it. Third, due to the mobility
of the profession and the lack of adequate records, it Would be difficult
for the commissioner to determine the "eligible physicians." Fourth,
recent supplements to the law added to the list of "eligibles" dentists,
duly registered bio-analysts and chiropodists. 23 The addition of these
professions, each entitled to vote with respect to a new plan, appears to be
inconsistent with the legislative intent of assuring an adequate choice
of physicians 24 since an applicant could comply with the statute by
filling his roster to a substantial degree with unavailable physicians
or those mentioned above.
The problem of severability is discussed; but since the commissioner
is granted broad regulatory powers to make certain that the plan's "condition or methods of operation are not such as would render its operations
hazardous to the public or its subscribers, ' 25 he can decide upon each
plan on a case-by-case basis and still effectuate the legislature's intent. 26
Although the declaration of this requirement as being unconstitutional
may not invalidate the remainder of the statute, there still exists no
definite basis on which the commissioner can decide the number of
participating physicians necessary for any specific plan. His only limitation is that he must act in the public welfare.
It appears that the challenged section of this statute is unrelated
to what the legislative purpose should be, that is, to dictate as to the
competency and standards of the medical performance. The majority
22. Blue Shield chart shows that ratio varies from 1,290 to 1 in Warren County
to 522 to I in Essex County.
23. Medical Service Corporations Law, N.J.S.A. 17:48A-28, 17:48A-27, 17:48A-26.
24. The court observed "that it is inconceivable that the large increase in the
statutory base due to the addition of all licensed dentists would ever be reasonably related to the minimal percentage of total claims which would be filed for such services."
25. Medical Service Corporations Law, N.J.S.A. 17:48A-3, 17:48A-9, 17:48A-10,
17:48A-15 to 20.
26. Bd. of Health of New Jersey v. Schwartz Bros. Co., 86 N.J.L. 170, 90 Atl.
1061 (Ct. Err. & App. 1914).
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of physicians in the county by approving or disapproving of a proposed
plan could control any medical service plan in that county. An adequate
number of competent physicians in a particular county may be willing
to serve a considerable portion of willing citizens in, the county but
would be precluded from doing so by the majority of their profession.
In effect, the majority could control the rates for medical service and
thereby reject, a sound but less lucrative plan.27 Such a power in this
group's control could be used selfishly to the benefit of both the existing
plan and the majority of physicians and to the detriment of the citizens
and the minority of physicians.
This regulatory requirement of the statute is lacking in due process
and is an improper delegation of public power to a private group.
John A. Luchsinger

CORPORATIONS

-

CORPORATION By ESTOPPEL -

DEALT WITH ASSOCIATION ON CORPORATE BASIS Is

CREDITOR WHO
ESTOPPED FROM

DENYING CORPORATE EXISTENCE.

Cranson v. Intl Business Machines CQrp. (Md. 1964)
In April, 1961, defendant met with a group of interested individuals
to form The Real Estate Service Bureau (hereinafter, the Bureau),
a corporation. The certificate of incorporation was then duly signed
and acknowledged. Defendant shortly thereafter, being advised that
the corporation was formed under the laws of Maryland, paid for and
received his stock certificate. The venture, with defendant as president,
commenced operations as a corporation, through corporate bank accounts,
maintaining corporate books, and under a lease executed in the corporate
name. Through the attorney's oversight, the certificate of incorporation
was not filed until November 24, 1961. Prior to such filing, the Bureau,
through the defendant, purchased eight typewriters from plaintiff. Partial
payment was made by the Bureau. Plaintiff brought suit for the balance
due on the theory that defendant was a partner in the business conducted by the Bureau, in consequence of the defective incorporation.
A summary judgment for the plaintiff was reversed by the Supreme
Court of Maryland, which held that plaintiff, having dealt with the
Bureau as a corporation and relied on its credit as such, was estopped
to deny its corporate existence. Cranson v. Int'l Business Machines Corp.,
234 Md. 477, 200 A.2d 33 (1964).
The equitable doctrine of "corporation by estoppel" evolved as a
conception of the judiciary purporting to promote equity in circum27. Blue Shield was the only medical service corporation in existence in New
Jersey.
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stances similar to the instant case,' where de jure or de facto 2 existence
had not been achieved. The basic tenet of the theory, as applied to
the present fact situation, is reflected by the court's reasoning in the
instant case. The court concludes that since credit was extended in
reliance upon the association's ability to meet the obligation, the creditor
may not now renounce his reliance and assail the incorporators 3 with
personal liability for the debt.
Two major approaches have been suggested for expressing the
manifestation by the creditor of his reliance solely on "corporate" credit.
The first is a rather loose application of the terminology of equitable
estoppel. 4 Obviously the creditor has made no misleading representation,
but the courts substitute his admission of defendant's incorporation and
deem it inequitable to permit him to retract that admission. The estoppel
terminology appears thoroughly inappropriate since this admission certainly elicited no reliance and was not the inducement for the association
to enter into the contract. Yet this approach is used almost unanimously
by the courts.5
The second, and seemingly more realistic approach, is to consider the
limitation of liability an implicit term of the contract. 6 This theory rests
on the premise that the term "corporation" connotes a recognition of
limited liability. Thus, it proceeds, the use of the term to describe the
contracting party necessarily connotes a concurrent agreement to look
7
only to "corporate assets" for satisfaction.
1. The doctrine has been applied in three basic situations:
(a) where the corporation is being sued and the incorporators deny legal
existence to avoid liability. (This is a case for 'true estoppel'.)
(b) where the corporation is suing and defendant pleads lack of plaintiff's
capacity, or
(c) where the incorporators are being sued for a corporate obligation, they
attempt to assert estoppel to avoid liability.
This note will concentrate on the third situation, the facts of the main case.
2. Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Shepard, 185 U.S. 1, 13 (1902), expressed the
requirements for de facto incorporation as: (a) A valid law under which such a corporation can be formed; (b) An attempt to organize thereunder; (c) Actual user of
the corporate franchise.
3. Since the incorporators and shareholders in the main case, as in most cases of
this type, were the same, the terms are, for purposes of this note, used interchangeably.
The liabilities are those of shareholders.
4. "Estoppel by representation consists in holding for truth a representation
acted upon when the person who made it, or his privies, seek to deny its truth and to
deprive the party who has acted upon it of the benefit obtained." BIcGLOW, ESTOPgrL
603 (6th ed. 1913).
5. Whitney v. Wyman, 101 U.S. 392 (1879); Snider's Sons Co. v. Troy, 91 Ala.
224, 8 So. 658 (1890); Petersen v. Cloverdale Egg Farms, 161 Cal. App. 2d 792,
327 P.2d 127 (1958)
(plaintiff previously associated with corporation); City of
Jefferson v. Holder, 195 Ga. 346, 24 S.E.2d 187 (1943) (statute) ; Tisch Auto Supply
Co. v. Nelson, 222 Mich. 196, 192 N.W. 600 (1923) ; Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc. v. Biggs,
205 Ore. 473, 288 P.2d 1025 (1955) (counterclaim).
6. See Dodd, Partnership Liability of Stockholders in Defective Corporations,
40 HARV. L. Rnv. 521, 552 (1927) ; Lewinsohn, Liability to Third Persons of Associates
In Defectively Incorporated Associations, 13 MicH. L. RXv. 271, 284 (1915).
7. But see Dodd, op. cit. supra note 6, at 554:
The state of mind of one who agrees to limit the liability of another, which
but for such agreement would be absolute, is plainly somewhat different from the
state of mind off one who accepts as true another's erroneous statement that his
liability is limited by law and deals with him on that assumption.
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A substantial number of courts have limited the application of this
concept to situations in which the association has achieved a de facto
corporate existence. 8 Other courts have handed down vague opinions,
failing to distinguish the estoppel doctrine from the de facto corporations
doctrine. The Maryland Supreme Court, in the instant case, reviewed
and clarified that state's position, recognizing the two doctrines as
distinct and independent. 9 Two prior cases' ° were overruled insofar
as they held attainment of de facto corporate status a prerequisite to the
invocation of the estoppel doctrine.
Modern cases tend to support the idea that the de facto limitation
renders the concept of estoppel entirely superfluous." It is submitted
that such limitation is not only an evasion of the issue, but is, in effect,
a total rejection of the concept. Those courts which invoke the doctrine
in the absence of de facto incorporation, limit its application to those cases
where it is deemed inequitable not to apply it. This serves as the
foundation upon which the Maryland Supreme Court would rest its
decision in the instant case. The court's reasoning in Cranson rests upon
the twofold proposition that (a) the creditor entered into the transaction
relying solely on the credit of the "corporation" and to permit him now
to assert liability against the incorporators would grant him an unanticipated windfall, while (b) subjecting the incorporators to a liability they
never bargained for. This analysis conforms to that of most jurisdictions
2
when invoking estoppel in similar situations.'
An analogous situation arises in the law of agency when the agent
of an undisclosed principal enters into contractual relations with a
third party. T contracts, relying solely on the credit of A. Yet, assuming
that A acted within his authority to contract for P, courts allow T recourse
against P when his existence and identity are discovered.' 3 Thus the
third party becomes the beneficiary of an unanticipated windfall. And
this is deemed applicable even though an agreement between the agent
and principal states that the agent alone shall be liable on contracts he
8. Harrill v. Davis, 168 Fed. 187 (8th Cir. 1909) ; Jones v. Aspen Hardware
Co., 21 Colo. 263, 40 Pac. 457 (1895); Pocahontas Fuel Co. v. Tarboro Cotton
Factory, 174 N.C. 245, 93 S.E. 790 (1917) ; Puro Filter Corp. of America v. Trembley,
266 App. Div. 750, 41 N.Y.S.2d 472 (1943).
9. Cranson v. Int'l Business Machines Corp., 234 Md. 477, 481, 200 A.2d 33, 38
(1964). The court stated:
Although some cases tend to assimilate the doctrines of incorporation de facto

and by estoppel, each is a distinct theory and they are not dependent on one another
the estoppel theory is applied only to the facts of each
in their application ....

particular case and may be invoked even where there is no corporation de facto.

10. Nat'l Shutter Bar Co. v. Zimmerman & Co., 110 Md. 313, 73 At. 19 (1909) ;
Maryland Tube & Iron Works v. West End Implement Co., 87 Md. 207, 39 At.
620 (1898).
11. Gardner v. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. Co., 73 Minn. 517, 76 N.W. 282 (1898)
Pearson Drainage Dist. v. Erhardt, 239 Mo. App. 845, 201 S.W.2d 484 (1947).
12. See cases cited supra note 4.
13. Luce v. Sutton, 115 Cal. App. 2d 428, 252 P.2d 352 (1953) ; Vigdor v. Nelson,
322 Mass. 670, 79 N.E.2d 288 (1948) ; Bourdo v. Preston, 259 Wis. 97, 47 N.W.2d 439
(1951) ; RESTATEMENT (SIcoND), AGENCY § 186 (1957).
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enters into in the undisclosed principal's behalf.' 4 With this added element,
the principal is subjected to liability he has expressly attempted to avoid.
This is not to suggest that agency law is applicable in the instant
situation,15 but it is submitted that if the incorporators are equated with
P, the defective corporation with A and the creditor with T, the equitable
considerations are analogous. In the agency situation, the courts deem
it unfair that the principal be insulated from liability since the business
transacted was his and likewise it was his opportunity to profit. 16 In the
corporate situation, the business is carried on in the interest of the
shareholders and it cannot be denied that the profits accrue to their
benefit. The most significant advantage of the corporate form, that
of limited liability, is theirs by mere compliance with the incorporation
statute. Under modern statutes, the procedure is rather simple and
yet grants a privilege which is withheld from other common forms,
unless contractual language clearly dictates otherwise. 17 Nevertheless,
the courts persist in granting the privilege to those who attempt the
corporate form, in spite of their negligent non-compliance.
The principal is, however, exculpated from liability by a clause in
the contract between the agent and the third party which expressly
renounces the liability of any undisclosed principal.' 8 Consequently, if
the theory that limited liability is an implied term of the contract in
dealings with defective corporations has any validity,' 9 releasing the
incorporators may be consistent with the law of agency.
In those situations where the estoppel doctrine is deemed inapplicable,
the court faces the further task of determining the true status of the
shareholders. The problem never arose in the Cranson case, but the
court indicated that they would consider the shareholders partners in the
enterprise 20 if estoppel was inapplicable. The partnership theory predominates the case law 21 and generally presents itself as the most feasible
22
solution.
14. Collentine v. Johnson, 203 Iowa 109, 202 N.W. 535 (1925); RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND), AGENCY § 189, comment a; see Annot. 130 A.L.R. 664, 666.

15. The agency considerations are here submitted for analogical purposes only

and should not be confused with the application of agency law proposed by Dodd,
op. cit. supra note 6, at 554.
16. For a discussion of the underlying considerations involved see Mechem, The
Liability Of An Undisclosed Principal, 23 HARV. L. Rev. 513 (1910).
17. See e.g., Hess v. Woertz, 4 S.&R. 356 (Pa. 1818). Gibson, J., said in regard
to an attempt by a partnership to contractually limit its liability:
I see no reason to doubt but that they may limit their responsibility by an
explicit stipulation ....
But this is a stipulation so unreasonable . . . that unless
it appear unequivocally plain from the terms of the contract, I will never suppose
it to have been in view of the parties.
For further analysis of this problem see Lewinsohn, op. cit. supra note 6, at 282.
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 189 (1957).

19. But see Dodd, op. cit. supra note 6.
20. 200 A.2d at 34, n.1.
21. Harrill v. Davis, 168 Fed. 187 (8th Cir. 1909) ; cf. Burks v. Cook, 225 Ark.
756, 284 S.W.2d 855 (1955); Contra Baker v. Bates-Street Shirt Co., 6 F.2d 854
(1st Cir. 1925).
22. For excellent surveys of this area see: Dodd, Partnership Liability of Stockholders in Defective Corporations,40 HARv. L. REv. 521 (1927) ; Lewinsohn, Liability
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The popularity of the partnership concept results from two major
factors: 2 (a)
the Uniform Partnership Act's flexible definition of
"partner" 3 and (b) the fact that in most defective incorporation crises
a small number of shareholders are involved, each of whom exercises
some degree of control. When the organization is larger and the partnership liability descends upon a holder of only slight interest whose participation in management and control is minimal or wholly absent, a
discussion of equitable considerations becomes moot. In dealing with
the latter situation, several courts have devised means to exonerate
the non-participants from liability and thereby avoid inequity. One
well-known decision, Baker v. Bates-Street Shirt Co., 24 held the active
manager, who was also an incorporator-stockholder, liable individually
for debts incurred in the "corporate" name. The liability was imposed
on the theory that he was the agent of a "non-existent principal." The
other shareholders were released from liability since they had not actively
participated in the conduct of the business. Such limitation has been
effected in applying the partnership theory by labeling as partners only
25
those who actively participated.
Many states have attempted to resolve the estoppel dilemma by
statutory formulation. A few jurisdictions 26 have, by statute, decreed
that dealings on a corporate basis constitute an estoppel as to both
parties. A greater number have, in conformity with Section 50 of the
Model Business Corporation Act, 27 stated specifically what constitutes
compliance, thus practically eliminating the problems of de facto incorporation. A few of the latter have also enacted section 139 of the
Model Act 28 which imposes joint and several liability upon those who
defectively assume corporate authority.
to Third Persons Of Associates In Defectively Incorporated Associations, 13 MIcH.
L. Rnv. 231 (1915); contra Magruder, A Note On The Partnership Liability Of
Stockholders In Defective Corporations, 40 HARV. L. Rtv. 733 (1927).
23. UNIVORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 6 (1) :
A partnership is an association of two or more persons to carry on as coowners a business for profit.
24. 6 F.2d 854 (1st Cir. 1925), noted in 14 CALIF. L. Riy. 486 (1926).
25. Burks v. Cook, 225 Ark. 756, 284 S.W.2d 855 (1955).
26. See e.g., McGuire v. Bastain Blessing Co., 275 Ky. 622, 122 S.W.2d 513
(1938); Farmer's Union Co-op. Royalty Co. v. Southward, 183 Okla. 402, 82 P.2d 819
(1938); Payne v. Bracken, 131 Tex. 394, 90 S.W.2d 607 (1936). Among the states
having such statutes are Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Montana, Oklahoma,
Nebraska, Tennessee and Texas.
27. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 50 (1953):
Upon the issuance of the certificate of incorporation, the corporate existence
shall begin, and such certificate of incorporation shall be conclusive evidence that
all conditions precedent required to be performed by the incorporators have been
complied with and that the corporation has been incorporated under this act,
except as against this State in a proceeding to cancel or revoke the certificate of
incorporation or for involuntary dissolution of the corporation.
28. Id. § 139:
All persons who assume to act as a corporation without authority so to do
shall be jointly and severally liable for all debts and liabilities incurred or arising
as a result thereof.
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The recent decision of Robertson v. Levy 29 dealt with a fact situation similar to the instant case. The court, relying on Sections 50 and
139,30 found for the plaintiff, expressly precluding any possible use of
the de facto or estoppel doctrines under the act.3 ' The court stated:
* . the impact of these sections, when considered together, is to eliminate
the concepts of estoppel and de facto corporateness under the Business
Corporation Act of the District of Columbia.

3' 2

The provisions of section 139 of the Model Act are invaluable for
their resolution of the estoppel problem, but the terminology casts no
light on the further problem of the parties' status. It is unclear whether
the joint and several liability extends to all stockholders or is limited
to those who actively participate. Policy considerations indicate that
more equitable results flow from statutory provisions similar to those
of the Model Act. The courts generally rely heavily on the "good faith"
of the incorporators when invoking estoppel in situations similar to
the main case.
It is submitted that both parties have acted in good faith and that,
since the problem generally arises only when the "corporation" is bankrupt or insolvent, the non-negligent party bears the loss if estoppel is
invoked. 33 Further, it is unquestionably easier for the incorporators to
be assured they have complied with the statute than for a creditor to
assure himself that every corporation he deals with is adequately formed.
The statute therefore serves to place the risk of non-compliance where
it properly belongs.
Richard H. Zamboldi

DOMESTIC RELATIONS

SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AGREEMENT
EXPRESSLY MADE CONDITIONAL ON OBTAINING DIVORCE INVALID
AS TENDING TO DISSOLVE MARRIAGE

Viles v. Viles (N.Y. 1964)
Defendant husband and plaintiff wife had separated, with little likelihood of reconciliation, after twelve years of marriage. Defendant had
29. 197 A.2d 443 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
30. Bus. Corp. Act of D.C. §§ 29-921c and 29-950 are enactments of ABA-ALI

MODEL Bus. CORP.

AcT §§ 50 and 139, respectively.

31. Apparently the court failed to consider other situations, e.g., where the plaintiff
attempts to hold the association as a corporation. It seems the statute would not bar
estoppel in such circumstances since that would be a case for "true" estoppel.
32. Robertson v. Levy, 197 A.2d 443, 447 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
33. Harrill v. Davis, 168 Fed. 187 (1st Cir. 1909):
The burden is not on the strangers who deal with them as a corporation, but
on themselves who act under the name of a pretended corporation, to see that it is
so organized that it exempts them from individual liability, and if they fail in
this they must pay the liabilities they incur, even in the absence of fraud or bad
faith, upon the salutary principle that where one of two parties must suffer he
must bear the loss whose breach of duty caused it. (Emphasis added.)
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an average annual income of $23,200 and, at the time of separation,
consented to an agreement whereby he was to pay his wife $400.00 per
month. Three months later, with both parties contemplating divorce,
a new separation agreement - the focal point of the controversy - was
negotiated and signed. This agreement increased the amount of the
monthly payments to $458.33. In addition, it contained provisions
whereby defendant would pay plaintiff's counsel fees in the divorce suit
and reimburse her for expenses incurred in establishing a residence in
the Virgin Islands, where a divorce decree was to be ultimately granted.
There was also a collateral oral agreement which provided that the
written agreement would take effect only on condition that plaintiff
be successful in her divorce suit. When, after divorce, defendant ceased
payments under the new agreement, the wife sued to recover arrears
and have the agreement enforced. The Court of Appeals, in affirming
the Supreme Court, Appellate Division,' denied recovery 2 on the basis of
Domestic Relations Law, Section 513 and held the separation agreement,
in light of the collateral oral agreement, invalid as one which had a direct
tendency to alter or dissolve the marriage. Viles v. Viles, 14 N.Y.2d 365,
251 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1964).
Section 51 cited above represents the prevailing rule that any agreement between husband and wife, intended to promote the procurement
of a divorce or to alter or dissolve a marriage is contrary to public
policy and void. 4 The public policy rendering such agreements void
is the policy to foster and protect marriage, to encourage the parties to
live together, and to prevent separation, since marriage is the foundation
of the family and of society, without which there would be neither
civilization nor progress. 5 This view evolved slowly from a common
law rule under which contracts between spouses were construed quite
6
restrictively. It was enunciated in the early case of Daggett v. Daggett,
wherein:
1. Viles v. Viles, 20 App. Div. 2d 626, 245 N.Y.S.2d 981 (1963). This case, in
turn, affirmed the decision of the Supreme Court, New York County, Special and Trial
Term. Viles v. Viles, 36 Misc. 2d 731, 233 N.Y.S.2d 112 (1962).
2. Burke, J., wrote the majority opinion with Desmond, C.J., Dye and Scileppi,
JJ., concurring, while Van Voorhis, J., dissented with the concurrence of Fuld and
Bergan, JJ.
3. N.Y. DoMESTIc RELATIONS LAW § 51 provides, in part:

A married woman has all the rights in respect to property, real or personal,
and the acquisition, use, enjoyment and disposition thereof, and to make contracts
in respect thereto with any person, including her husband, and to carry on any
business, trade or occupation, and to exercise all powers and enjoy all rights in

respect thereto and in respect to her contracts and be liable on such contracts,

as if she were unmarried; but a husband and wife cannot contract to alter or
dissolve the marriage or to relieve the husband from his liability to support his
wife or to relieve the wife of liability to support her husband provided that she is
possessed of sufficient means and he is incapable of supporting himself and is

or is likely to become a public charge.
4. Annot., 130 A.L.R. 1008 (1941) ; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS 586 (1932);
6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS 1743 (rev. ed. 1938).
5. See 17 AM. JUR. Divorce and Separation § 12 and the authorities cited therein.
6. 5 Paige 509, 28 Am. Dec. 442 (Ch. N.Y. 1835).
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the Chancellor said that, so long as the marriage contract remained
in force, the wife was not legally competent to make a valid contract with her husband in relation to her right to alimony; and
that such agreements made in advance, . . . would have a tendency

to produce collusion between parties with
a view to the dissolution
7
of the marriage contract between them.
At common law, then, a wife could not legally contract to live
apart from her husband since such agreements were considered acts
of fraud on the courtA. One exception was recognized which allowed
a property settlement or separation agreement to be enforceable at law
when entered into on behalf of the wife through the medium of a
trustee.9 However, since those early decisions, the courts have moved
in the direction of legalizing separation agreements made during marriage,
so long as they are not agreements to separate or to release the husband
from his obligation to support the wife.' ° In the great majority of the
states, a husband and wife now have the capacity to make a property
settlement or separation agreement with each other, either by virtue of
a statute authorizing them to do so or by a statute which gives a
husband and wife the general power to contract with each other, so
long as the agreement is not promotive of divorce." Indeed, at the present
time, the courts look with favor upon voluntary separation agreements,
12
thus having come almost full circle in their thinking.
However, still clearly unenforceable under the prevailing rule of
law are the following: agreements to withdraw opposition to, or not
to contest, divorce proceedings ;13 agreements to procure or supply testimony of facts which will successfully support or defeat a divorce action ;14
or agreements which provide that payment to the party procuring
evidence to be used in such an action is contingent on the result of that
action. 15 Other examples of contracts held void as contra bonos mores
in that they tend to promote the dissolution of marriage include agreements by a husband to pay a fixed sum to his wife in satisfaction of her
claims for alimony, if he should thereafter give the wife cause for
7. Id. at 509, 28 Am. Dec. at 442.
8. See Gallemore v. Gallemore, 94 Fla. 516, 114 So. 371 (1927); MADDEN,

PERSONs AND DoMEsTic RELArIONs 333 (1931)

; Note, 7 MINN. L. REv. 592 (1923).

9. See 17A AM. JUR. Divorce and Separation § 885 and the authorities cited in
note 19.
10. Hill v. Hill, 23 Cal. 2d 82, 142 P.2d 417 (1943) ; Winter v. Winter, 191 N.Y.
462, 84 N.E. 382 (1908); Galusha v. Galusha, 116 N.Y. 635, 22 N.E. 1114 (1889).
11. 17A AM. JUR. Divorce and Separation § 885; Winter v. Winter, 191 N.Y. 462,
84 N.E. 382 (1908).
12. Hill v. Hill, 23 Cal. 2d 82, 142 P.2d 417 (1943) ; Walters v. Walters, 409 Ill.
298, 99 N.E.2d 342 (1941), wherein the court states:
Parties to divorce suits are to be commended for their attempts to settle their
property interests amicably. This not only saves the courts from being fraught
with detail, and the necessity of respected, recurrent hearings, but leads to better
feeling and peace of mind among the litigants.
13. Pereira v. Pereira, 156 Cal. 1, 103 Pac. 488 (1909) ; Staedler v. Staedler,
6 N.J. 380, 78 A.2d 896 (1951).
14. Hare v. McGue, 178 Cal. 740, 174 Pac. 663 (1918).
15. Harris v. Moore, 102 Cal. App. 413, 283 Pac. 76 (1929).
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divorce"' and agreements between the plaintiff in a divorce action and
17
her attorney for a contingent fee.
Posing more of a problem for the courts today are cases with facts
similar to those of the principal case. In such cases, the separation agreement may or may not promote the procurement of a divorce. What rule
of thumb, what test, if any, can be used to determine in these cases
whether the agreement is promotive of divorce or tends to alter or
dissolve the marriage? The dissenters in the Viles case believe that the
decisive factor should be the substance of the transaction, not the mere
form. In addition, an agreement should be declared void only if the wife
is given substantially more money than she could obtain in court as inducement to bring an action for divorce. Applying the above criteria
to the Viles case, the dissenting judges would find that the separation
agreement was not violative of section 51. Having stressed the estrangement of the parties and their mutual desire for divorce, the dissenters
argue that they cannot understand how public policy will be promoted
by relieving the defendant from his obligations under this agreement
which he signed, thereby denying recovery to his former wife,' 8 since
the agreement did not provide excessive benefits for the wife. They
contend that the $58.33 increase in monthly payments cannot be considered prima. facie evidence of collusion. Nor is the increase more than
evidentiary in tending to prove that the new agreement was the cause
of procuring the divorce; rather, it represented an honest effort by
the husband to avoid having his wife obtain a divorce in some other
manner at a greater inconvenience to him. The divorce would have
been procured in any event. The increase in payments served only to
have it obtained more amicably. The dissenting judges also fail to see
how public policy is served by compelling estranged spouses to contest
in court every detail of their marital differences. Public policy would
more probably be advanced by minimizing, rather than by increasing,
the bitterness attendant upon separation. In essence, the dissenters fail
to see in what way the written separation agreement, 'together with the
collateral oral agreement, made the procurement of a divorce any more
probable than in their absence. And if they are correct in this conclusion,
it must follow, they contend, that the agreement should have been
enforced exactly as negotiated.
The validity of the tests propounded by the dissent is demonstrated
by their widespread use both in New York and throughout the country.' 9
16. Lane v. Lane, 78 Cal. App. 326, 248 Pac. 686 (1926); Pereira v. Pereira,

156 Cal. 1, 103 Pac. 488 (1909).
17. Newman v. Freitas, 129 Cal. 283, 61 Pac. 907 (1902).
18. Viles v. Viles, 14 N.Y.2d 365, 368, 251 N.Y.S.2d 672, 674 (1964).
19. Hill v. Hill, 23 Cal. 2d 82, 142 P.2d 417 (1943) ; Brunner v. Brunner, 63 Cal.
App. 2d 429, 146 P.2d 709 (1944) ; Maisch v. Maisch, 87 Conn. 377, 87 Atl. 729
(1913) ; Reynolds v. Owens, 328 Mass. 451, 104 N.E.2d 146 (1952) ; Kull v. Losch,
328 Mich. 519, 44 N.W.2d 169 (1950) ; Yates v. Yates, 183 Misc. 934, 51 N.Y.S.2d 135
(Sup. Ct. 1944). But see Pereira v. Pereira, 156 Cal. 1, 103 Pac. 488 (1909) ; Schley v.
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These tests are clearly enunciated0 in two decisions relied on by the
dissent.
The first of these cases, Hill v. Hill,20 is a much-noted case, 2' very
close in factual situation to the instant case. The couple had been separated
for over two years and there was no expectation of a reconciliation. In
fact, divorce was contemplated by both parties. As In Viles, there was no
agreement to obtain a divorce, rather a separation agreement which would
take effect when, and only when, the wife obtained a divorce. The
Supreme Court of California, in reversing the decision of the trial
court, 22 unanimously upheld the plaintiff wife's action for sums due

under the agreement and defended its conclusion in a well-written and
equally well-documented opinion. Having reviewed the general concepts
concerning separation agreements, the court said that the theory of the
law has been to prohibit agreements which have for their purpose the
severance of the marital relation in the future but not to invalidate agreements where separation has occurred or is imminent. The Hill court's
analysis of the crux of the problem is difficult to improve upon:
While it is true that contracts condemned by the courts usually
have been termed 'promotive of divorce' as distinguished from those
'incidental to divorce' or 'conditional upon divorce', this terminology
is not always accurate or descriptive. The validity of such contracts
must be determined in the light of the factual background of each
case and considerations of public policy appropriate thereto. Most
property settlement agreements are incidental to or conditioned upon
divorce, since they are means employed in the disposition of property
upon divorce, and they are also promotive of divorce in the sense
facilitates the comthat an amicable adjustment of property rights
23
pletion of contemplated divorce proceedings.
Public policy does not discourage divorce where the relations
between husband and wife are such that the legitimate objects of
matrimony have been utterly destroyed. .

.

.

(Citation omitted).

In the absence of fraud, collusion or imposition upon the court,
public policy does not prevent parties who have separated from
entering into a contract disposing of their property rights which
shall become effective only in the event one of the parties obtains
a divorce, even though such a contract may be a factor in persuading
24
a party who has a good cause for divorce to proceed to establish it.
The court was of the opinion that the separation agreement did
not interfere with the real, substantial status of the marriage contract.
Andrews, 225 N.Y. 110, 121 N.E. 812 (1919); Niman v. Niman, 15 Misc. 2d 1095,
181 N.Y.S.2d 260 (Sup. Ct. 1958), aff'd, 8 App. Div. 2d 793, 188 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1st
Dept. 1959).
20. 23 Cal. 2d 82, 142 P.2d 417 (1943).
21. According to SHEPPARD'S PACirIc REPORTER CITATIONS, the Hill case has
been cited 47 times since being decided in 1943. For favorable comment, see 31 CALIF.
L. REV. 596 (1943) and 17 So. CALIF. L. Rv. 184 (1944).
22. 133 P.2d 445 (Cal. 1943).
23. Hill v. Hill, 23 Cal. 2d 82, 88, 142 P.2d 417, 422 (1943).
24. Id. at 88, 142 P.2d at 422.
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Since the parties were husband and wife in name only, the agreement
did not facilitate the divorce any more than the numerous valid property
25
settlements which California courts have recognized and approved.
This practical approach by the California court is that used by the
dissenters in Viles. It is worthy of careful consideration. The alternate
approach, the strictly legalistic one employed by the majority in Viles
could very well have led to an opposite determination in the Hill case, thus
ignoring the real equities of the parties.
In the second case, Yates v. Yates, 26 likewise a frequently cited
opinion 2 7 the wife, relying on a separation agreement of the type found
in Viles, sued for and was granted a divorce in Florida. This procedure
had been orally agreed upon in advance of the written agreement and
before she left her domicile. Defendant had paid his wife the estimated
expense of the divorce on the day before the separation agreement was
entered into in contemplation of divorce in the sense that both parties
desired to have the marriage dissolved and intended to make financial
agreements to that end. The court held the basic principle to be that
separation agreements should be judged as to whether they contain
provisions having a tendency to effect divorces which would not occur
otherwise. The court urged that only if the financial provisions agreed
upon are substantially in excess of what the divorce court would allow,
is a separation agreement void as against public policy regardless of
whether there exists a legal basis on which the marriage could be dissolved.
As mentioned before, 28 the criteria applied in the Hill and Yates
cases have not received universal acceptance. Cases with factual situations similar to that of the instant case can be found in which courts
have refused to enforce such agreements. 29 However, the Yates and
Hill decisions represent the forward-thinking approach in this area and
lay down both a sensible and equitable solution to the problem.
It is hoped that a new rule, having for its effect an easing of the
heretofore tight rein of public policy, might be formulated to read that
where parties who have separated and who contemplate divorce proceedings conclude between themselves, absent any fraudulent collusion, a
voluntary separation agreement that, though conditional upon the procurement of a divorce, is equitable in its terms, the agreement will be
enforceable as not contra bonos mores. The adoption of such a rule
would enable the courts to make the fine distinctions necessary to do
justice in cases of the type under discussion. Every case will then
25. Id. at 89, 142 P.2d at 423.
26. 183 Misc. 934, 51 N.Y.S.2d 135 (1944).
27. According to SHEPPARD'S NEw YORK SUPPLEMENT CITATIONS, the Yates case
has been cited 29 times since it was decided.
28. See note 19 supra.
29. Schley v. Andrews, 225 N.Y. 110, 121 N.E. 812 (1919) ; Reed v. Robertson,
276 App. Div. 902, 94 N.Y.S.2d 905 (1950), aff'd, 302 N.Y. 596, 96 N.E.2d 894 (1951) ;
Niman v. Niman, 15 Misc. 2d 1095, 181 N.Y.S.2d 260 (Sup. Ct. 1958), aff'd, 8 App.
Div. 2d 793, 188 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1st Dept. 1959).
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necessitate a close analysis and could not so easily be placed under the
operation of the all-to-general prevailing rule that any agreement promoting divorce is unenforceable.
As it stands, the decision of the court in the Viles case is an unfortunate one. Though the case deals with a problem of increasing
occurrence and importance today, the court applied a solution apropos to
the nineteenth century and dealt the law in this area at least a temporary
setback. In failing to evaluate the facts adequately and to consider
the policy of the law as regards the problem presented, the court
applied a valid but inappropriate rule of law, the application of which can
result only in more and more bitterly contested litigation.
William T. Define
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Brown v. United States (9th Cir. 1964)
Defendant, while a Communist Party member, was elected a member
of the executive board of a local of the International Longshoremen's and
Warehousemen's Union on which he subsequently served. He was thereupon indicted for violation of section 504 of the Labor Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959,1 which imposed a criminal penalty
on a communist who held union office. His offer of evidence that he had
no intent to bring about any substantive evil was refused by the district
court, as was his request for instructions requiring a finding of such intent.
The court held that the statute did not require any proof of specific intent,
and that so construed, the statute was constitutional. Defendant was convicted and appealed.
1. (a) No person who is or has been a member of the Communist Party or
who has been convicted of, or served any part of a prison term resulting from
his conviction of, robbery, bribery, extortion, embezzlement, grand larceny, burglary, arson, violation of narcotics laws, murder, rape, assault with intent to kill,
assault which inflicts grievous bodily injury, or a violation of title 11 or III of
this Act, or conspiracy to commit any such crimes, shall serve(1) as an officer, director, trustee, member of any executive board or
similar governing body, business agent, manager, organizer, or other employee
(other than an employee performing exclusively clerical or custodial duties)

of any labor organization, or ...
during or for five years after the termination of his membership in the Communist
Party, or for five years after such conviction or'after the end of such imprisonment. ...

(b) Any person who willfillly violates this section shall be fined not more
than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both. ...
Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (Landrum-Griffin Act), § 504,
73 Stat. 536 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 504 (Supp. V, 1964) (hereinafter referred to

as LMRDA).
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The Ninth Circuit, three judges dissenting,2 reversed, holding that
section 504's imposition of criminal punishment on any Communist Party
member who becomes a union officer, regardless of lack of intent to further
any unlawful aims of the Party, infringed on the guarantees of the first and
fifth amendments; since section 504 was not susceptible to any other
construction, it was void. Brown v. United States, 334 F.2d 488 (9th
Cir. 1964).
Section 504 of the LMRDA, enacted in 1959, was the successor of
section 9(h) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947.3 Prior to
9(h)'s enactment, Congress had considerable evidence showing that communists had infiltrated labor unions in order to effect a means of interrupting commerce when expedient for them. 4 Enacted to remove the threat
of "political strikes," 9(h) barred the facilities of the National Labor
Relations Board to any labor organization whose officers failed to file with
the board an affidavit that they were not members of, or affiliated with,, the
Communist Party. Section 504 was designed to achieve more effectively
the congressional objectives of section 9(h) ;5 it was enacted ".

.

. in a

continuing effort by Congress, in its regulation of interstate commerce,
effectively to prevent the interruption of a free flow of commerce by
political strikes."
The extent to which the activities of Communist Party members may
7
be restrained is a question that has frequently been before federal courts.
2. Judge Hamley, without considering the constitutional issue, would have reversed and remanded for a new trial ". . . on the ground that the trial court erroneously
and prejudicially decided a question of fact which should have been left to the jury,
namely, whether the executive board of Local 10, I.L.W.U. is an 'executive board'
of a labor organization within the meaning of section 504.
... 334 F.2d 488, 502
(9th Cir. 1964). (See Judge Duniway's concurring opinion answering the objections
raised by Judge Hamley's dissent. Id. at 497.) Judges Chambers and Barnes would
have upheld the constitutionality of § 504, but agreed with the majority that it was
correct for the trial judge to tell the jury that Brown's executive board was one
within the meaning of § 504.
3. No investigation shall be made by the Board of any question affecting
commerce concerning the representation of employees, raised by a labor organization under subsection (c) of this section, no petition under section 9(e) (1) shall
be entertained, and no complaint shall be issued pursuant to a charge made by a
labor organization under subsection (b) of section 10, unless there is on file with
the Board an affidavit executed contemporaneously or within the preceding
twelve-month period by each officer of such labor organization and the officers of
any national or international labor organization of which it is an affiliate or
constituent unit that he is not a member of the Communist Party or affiliated
with such party, and that he does not believe in, and is not a member of or
supports any organization that believes in or teaches, the overthrow of the United
States Government by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional methods...
Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), § 9(h), 61 Stat. 146 (1947),
amending the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-66 (1958). Section 9(h) was repealed upon enactment of § 504 of the LMRDA.
4. See Hearings Before House Committee on Education and Labor on Bills to
Amend and Repeal the National Labor Relations Act, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 3611-15.
5. 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGtMENT REPORTING AND

DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, 791, 837 (1959).
6. Brown v. United States, 334 F.2d 488, 491 (9th Cir. 1964).
7. E.g., Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 84 S.Ct. 1659 (1964) ; Communist Party
of-the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961) ; Scales
v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961) ; Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961)
Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958) ; Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957)
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The threat that certain Communist Party activities pose to constitutional
government cannot be ignored; but constitutional liberties cannot be swept
aside uhder the guise of restraining potentially dangerousa ctivities. Constitutional rights are not absolute, but the reasons advanced in support of a
particular regulation must always be substantial enough to justify the
corresponding limitation of these rights. The Supreme Court, in American
Communications Ass'n v. Douds,5 believed that section 9(h) of the Labor
Management Relations Act struck this delicate balance. The statute's
relatively small effect upon freedom of association was found to be justified
by the congressional finding that communist union leaders were apt to
obstruct interstate commerce. Communist Party membership of a union
officer was sufficient to sustain 9(h)'s sanction on the union.
When a personal criminal penalty is sought to be imposed on a
communist for "illegal advocacy," however, the fact of mere Communist
Party membership is insufficient to justify the imposition of such a penalty.
Convictions under the Smith Act 9 for willfully advocating the necessity of
overthrowing the government by force must be supported by a finding of
specific intent. The requirement of an intention to overthrow the government by force as an essential element of such a crime was established in
Dennis v. United States' ° and affirmed in Yates v. United States." Such
an intention is not proved if defendant merely urges others to believe, as
an "abstract doctrine," that the government must be overthrown by force;
prohibited advocacy consists of urging others - by "language of incitement" -

".

.

. to do something, now or in the future

... .-12

to achieve

violent overthrow.
Proof of mere Communist Party membership is also insufficient to
sustain a conviction for violation of the membership clause of the Smith
Act. The constitutionality of this clause was upheld in Scales v. United
Statesi 3 only after the Supreme Court construed the Smith Act as punishing not knowing membership per se, but only "active" membership combined with a specific intent to further an unlawful purpose of the Communist Party. 14 The Court in Scales feared that punishment of Communist
Party membership per se would suppress legitimate political expression
and association. It recognized that the Communist Party has both legal
and illegal aims and that there may be members who use this organization
to advance legitimate political policies. Such members could not be punished
for adherence to constitutionally protected purposes because of other
unlawful purposes of the Party which they do not share.
American Communication Ass'n v.Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950); United States v.
Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 '(2d Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
8.339 U.S. 382 (1950).
9.18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1958).
10. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
11. 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
12. Id. at 325.
13. 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
14. InScales, the Court found the convictions supported by evidence sufficient to
meet this criterion; but inNoto v.United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961), a companion
case, the convictions were reversed for insufficiency of evidence.
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In the instant case, the court did not believe that the holding in Douds
would sustain the constitutionality of section 504. It distinguished Douds,
where the sanction was not a personal one, but rather was applied directly
to the union. It believed that section 5 04's imposition of a personal criminal
sanction on the basis of Communist Party membership posed ".

.

. new

and different problems as to the reasonableness of the regulation"' 5 and
presented questions similar to those raised in Scales v. United States.
Acknowledging the wide scope of congressional power to remove the
threat of political strikes, the court nevertheless found section 504 broader
than the threat it was designed to meet. Congress was found to have been
given the power both to remove and to punish the threat of political strikes
with no showing that such a threat was presented by the person being
punished. Without proof that defendant intended to accomplish that which
Congress sought to prevent, however, the court felt that the corresponding
restriction upon first amendment freedom of association could not be
justified.
Scales held that the relationship between "the underlying substantive
illegal conduct" and the fact of Communist Party membership must be
"sufficiently substantial" to satisfy the concept of personal guilt under due
process and that this relationship was not sufficiently substantial unless
defendant had a specific intent to further illegal party purposes. Relying
on the principles enumerated in Scales, the instant court found that the
underlying substantive evil conduct consisted of the anticipated efforts of
an individual to use union authority to disrupt interstate commerce.
Referring to Scales, it stated that the relationship between this conduct
and the fact of Communist Party membership was not sufficiently substantial to justify a personal criminal penalty without a finding of specific
intent. Since section 504 could not be construed as applying only to party
members with a specific intent to use union office to further illegal party
activities,' 6 it did not meet ". . . constitutional standards of criminal
-17
imputability from association to individual ....

Two of the dissents would have upheld 9(h)'s constitutionality without the specific intent requirement. Judge Chambers, in his dissenting
opinion,' 8 made an analogy between section 504 and the restrictions on
15. Brown v. United States, 334 F.2d 488, 495 (9th Cir. 1964).
16. The court stated that in Dennis, Yates and Scales, it was possible to construe
the Smith Act as requiring proof of specific intent and unlawfulness of advocacy
because the ambiguous statutory language used made such a construction available.
But the court felt that § 504 was not ambiguous statutory expression, but a "lack of
expression." The court said:
The segregation of guilty from what we have held must be innocent holding
of union office is not at all suggested by the statutory language. It is wholly inappropriate to consider whether scienter should be deemed essential, for the
very nature of the scienter that is constitutionally necessary is hidden. No
Communist Party member could know, from a reading of the statute, whether, of
the many party purposes, those which he personally embraces do or do not disqualify him from union office or employment. 334 F.2d 488, 497 (9th Cir. 1964).
17. Brown v. United States, 334 F.2d 488, 496 (9th Cir. 1964).
18. Id. at 505.
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conflicts of interest with criminal penalties found in other sections of the
United States Code. 19 He emphasized that the fact that many persons
named in these statutes would impartially discharge their duties is immaterial. "Disposition of the class of persons to commit" 20 as shown by
experience is sufficient to impose a criminal penalty without a showing
that defendant intended to do an unlawful act. It was his opinion that a
communist union officer's "disposition to commit" the substantive evil at
which 504 was aimed was strong enough to justify the corresponding
2
restriction on constitutional liberties. 1
The instant case presents an issue different than that before the Court
in Scales v. United States. In Scales, the problem was one of determining
whether Communist Party membership was a sufficient basis for imposing
criminal punishment on an individual; here, the problem was one of
determining whether Communist Party membership was a sufficient basis
for imposing criminal punishment, not on any and all individuals, but on
certain individuals - union officers. This factor - holding union office is a valid point of distinction between the two cases.
Officers of unions whose members are employed in interstate commerce occupy positions of great power over the national economy. Their
status is unique; through their authority or influence, they can bring about
work stoppages inimical to the public interest. A communist union officer
could cause greater harm to the public interest than could a communist
generally. The status of a communist union officer is sui generis; the
threat they pose to the public interest is far more substantial than that
posed by a communist who is not a union officer. Though the likelihood
that a communist union officer intends to advance unlawful party purposes
may be the same as that of any other communist, the gravity of the evil
that could be caused by the former is greater than that which could be
caused by the latter. In Scales, the relationship between Communist Party
membership and illegal advocacy was not sufficiently substantial to justify
imposition of personal guilt on an individual member; but here, if a criminal
penalty cannot be justified by the substantiality of the relationship between
communist union officers and potential obstruction of interstate commerce,
22
it can be justified by the substantiality of any resulting evil.
19. E.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 281, 283, 1909 (1958).
20. Brown v. United States, 334 F.2d 488, 505 (9th Cir. 1964). (Chambers, J.,
dissenting.)
21. "One doesn't need a right to be a union officer ... with a possible conflict
of interest with his government." Ibid. Judge Barnes concurred in Judge Chamber's
dissent believing that the delicate "balance struck by Congress comports with the
dictates of the Constitution." Id. (Barnes, J., dissenting.)
22. That the gravity of the "evil," as well as the likelihood of its occurrence,
must also be considered in assessing the validity of a particular regulation, was stated
by Hand, J., in United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950) : "In each case
they [the courts] must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger."
Id. at 212. On appeal, the Supreme Court approved of this statement: "We adopt
this statement of the rule. . . .It takes into consideration those factors which we
deem relevant, and relates to their significance." Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S.
494, 510 (1951).
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It cannot be denied that section 504 permits punishment of a threat
to the public interest without a showing that defendant presented such a
threat. But an answer to this objection is found in the dissent's reminder
that there are statutes restricting conflicts of interest with criminal penalties.
When experience has shown that certain classes of persons are likely to
commit an offense inimical to the public interest, "the fact that a high
' 23
percentage would discharge their duties without favoritism is to no avail.
In the instant case, Congress has found that communists had and would
continue to use their office to advance unlawful party policies, policies
detrimental to the public interest.
The situation presented by 504 may not be strictly analogous to other
conflicts of interest situations. Since section 504's prohibition applies to
individuals of a certain political affiliation, there exists the danger of suppressing legitimate political association. But the scope of 504's prohibition
is quite narrow; it does not restrain the activities of the Communist Party
as a political organization, nor does it impose a penalty on any and all
party members. It merely prohibits communists from holding positions of
great power over the national economy. 24 The first amendment requires
that one be permitted freedom of association. "It does not require that he
2
be permitted to be the keeper of the arsenal."
Scales rejected the hypothesis that Communist Party membership
per se could be punished. Prima facie, this statute would seem to impose
a criminal penalty on mere Communist Party membership and a mechanical
application of the principles enumerated in Scales dictates the conclusion
that 504 is unconstitutional. But a consideration of section 504's purpose
and effect indicates a contrary conclusion. Section 504 was not enacted to
penalize Communist Party membership; it was enacted to prohibit certain
classes of individuals - including communists - from occupying positions
where substantial harm could be done to the public interest. Any restraint
it places on legitimate political activity is merely incidental. Furthermore,
such restraints, as well as 504's criminal penalty, can be justified by the
substantiality of the evil to be remedied and by the "disposition of the class
of persons to commit.

' 26

Thomas J. Tumola
23. Brown v. United States, 334 U.S. 488, 505 (9th Cir. 1964). (Chambers, J.,
dissenting.)
24. The need for broad congressional power in this area was recognized in Douds:
The fact that the injury to interstate commerce would be an accomplished
fact before any sanctions could be applied, the possibility that a large number
of such strikes might be called at a time of external or internal crisis, and the
practical difficulties which would be encountered in detecting illegal activities of
this kind are factors which are persuasive that Congress should not be powerless
to remove the threat, not limited to punishing the act. 339 U.S. 382, 406 (1950).
25. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 412 (1950).
26. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari,... U.S. ... (1964) ; 33 L.W. 3171.
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THAT COMPETITOR'S PRICE WOULD BE MET.

Forster Mfg. Co. v. FTC (1st Cir. 1964)
The Federal Trade Commission' charged the Forster Manufacturing
Company, a Maine corporation engaged in the manufacture of woodenware products, with granting discriminatory prices in violation of section
2(a) 2 of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act.
Having learned from its buyers that a competitor was giving one case of
clothespins free for every ten purchased, Forster had made an equally low
offer available throughout the entire area.3 However, none of these buyers
had actually received such an offer and only one identified the competitor.
Forster contended that under section 2(b) 4 of the act, its actions were
justified.
In rejecting this defense, " the Commission interpreted section 2(b) as
contemplating purposeful action, requiring positive knowledge of both
the identity of the competitor and the lower price being offered. It
further stated that the seller who was discriminating in price must limit
his offer to a volume which the competitor was capable of producing.
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed, holding that to
establish the meeting of competition defense a seller need only show
the existence of facts which would lead a reasonable and prudent
person to believe that he would in fact meet the equally low price
of a competitor. Forster Mfg. Co. v. FTC,
F. 2d ....
(1st Cir.
1964).
The development of section 2(b) into a significant defense has occurred
in the face of attempts by both Legislature and Commission to limit its
effect.

Its most serious challenge came in the Standard Oil7 litigation

wherein the Commission sought to relegate the defense to a mere procedural device. The Supreme Court held, however, that section 2(b) af1. Hereinafter cited as Commission.

2. 49 Stat. 1526, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1958), amending 38 Stat. 730 (1914).
3. Forster controlled 70% of the Pittsburgh market, while the competitor was a
small manufacturer attempting to enter the market.
4. 49 Stat. 1526, 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1958), which provides in relevant part:
Provided, however, that nothing herein contained shall prevent a seller rebutting the prima facie case thus made by showing that his lower price . . . to any
purchaser . . . was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a
competitor ....
5. The defense was similarly rejected as to an additional item where Forster
had cut its price without knowledge of the competitor's price it was purporting
to meet.
6. Forster Mfg. Co., Trade Reg. Rep. f" 16243 (FTC Transfer Binder 1963).
Commissioner Dixon wrote the opinion for a 2 to 1 majority.
7. Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1951).
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forded an absolute defense, albeit more limited in scope than the original
provision in the Clayton Act." This decision prompted recurrent attempts
in the Legislature to adopt the Commission's position9 and the Commission
itself continued to impair the defense by imposing a harsh burden upon
sellers who invoked it.
The overall effect of court decisions has been to liberalize the
defense and act as a check on the Commission; however, the various
circuits have not adopted a uniform position. In FTC v. A. E. Staley
Mfg. Co.,' 0 in which the seller had acted on questionable oral statements
of purchasers without making any attempt to verify them, the Supreme
Court rejected the defense, holding that the seller must at least show
facts which would have satisfied a reasonable man." Other courts
have gone beyond this minimum standard. Indeed, the burden placed
upon a seller seeking to invoke the defense has varied from literal
adherence to the statutory language to a reasonable attempt in "good
faith' 1 2 to comply with its objectives. There is little certainty as to the
essential elements of a successful defense.
The Supreme Court has emphasized that the defense is available
only within the context of individual competitive situations.'3 To delineate
these, however, is a difficult task. The defense definitely precludes a
seller from systematically matching an artificial industry-wide pricing
system merely because his competitors are using it. 14 Some courts,
reading the requirement narrowly, have held that the seller can discriminate in price only in response to a firm offer made by a particular competing seller. 15 To require such knowledge seriously impairs a seller's
ability to realistically compete when he is aware of the availability of a
lower price, but not the identity of the competitor offering it. It is the
common practice of purchasing agents not to divulge information on
bids received from other sellers. In attempting to obtain lower prices,
8. Id. at 251. For a critical discussion of the case see AUSTIN, PRice DISCRIMINATION 93-99 (2d rev. ed. 1959). The author suggests that the legislative history
supported the Commission's position.
9. S. 11, H.R. 11, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956). These companion bills received
substantial support and were reintroduced in subsequent sessions.
10. 324 U.S. 746 (1945).
11. . . . [T]he statute at least requires a seller . ..to show the existence of facts
which would lead a reasonable and prudent person to believe that the granting
of a lower price would in fact meet the equally low price of a competitor.
(Emphasis added.) Id. at 759-60.
12. Imprecise use of this term has added greatly to the confusion surrounding the
defense. See generally EDWARDS, THEI PRicz DISCRIMINATIoN LAW 565-67 (1959).
It should "be utilized solely to test the seller's adherence to the basic objectives of
the meeting competition proviso." ATT'Y GEN. NAT'L COMM. ANTITRUST Rep. 184

(1955).

13. FTC v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746, 753 (1945); FTC v. Cement

Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 725 (1948).

14. FTC v. Nat'l Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419 (1957).
15. Standard Motor Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 265 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1959), affrming,
50 F.T.C. 624 (1954), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 826 (1959) ;Admiral Corp., 55 F.T.C. 2078
(1959) ; Carpel Frosted Foods, Inc., 48 F.T.C. 581 (1951).
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it is to their advantage to lead a seller to believe that his price is not
competitive, without giving him information which he could verify.
Indeed, it was readily apparent to this court that precise information,
either of the identity of the competitor or the price which he is offering,
16
is difficult to obtain.
Other courts have taken an approach consistent with commercial
practice. They have allowed a seller to respond to a generally available
price where there has been a reasonable basis for his action. This requirement has been satisfied by a knowledge of the standards for volume
7
discounts generally used in the industry.1
A similar difficulty arises in the seller's determination of his new
price scale. The relevant statutory language only sanctions a meeting of
competition, which cannot be assured unless the seller has precise knowledge of the price of his competitor. Despite the problems involved in
obtaining such information, some courts have adhered to a literal interpretation,1 8 forcing the seller to guess at his peril. Should he underprice his competitor he loses the defense. A volume iequirement has even
been read into the act, apparently because of the fear that a seller would
use the lower price of an insignificant competitor to justify a large
volume price cut to a powerful buyer.' Clearly such restrictions have
substantially lessened the vitality of the defense.
Other courts have recognized that occasional underpricing is inevitable
and have sanctioned it where incidental to a price reduction made in
"good faith. ' ' 20 This is the position which the Supreme Court, in the
Staley case,21 indicated to be desirable. Following that decision, the
22
Second Circuit modified its opinion in Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. FTC
and held that the intent of the seller should be controlling. In requiring
less accuracy, these decisions adopt a standard workable in the commercial context within which the seller must compete. The present case
follows this reasoning. It only requires that the seller have a reasonable
basis for his action. Yet it clearly would not go so far as to weaken
section 2 (a) of the act by allowing the seller to act on highly questionable
16. Forster Mfg. Co. v. FTC, ... F.2d .. (1st Cir. 1964). The court regarded
the Commission's attempt to force a change in purchasing practices as unrealistic.
17. Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 355 U.S. 396 (1958). The Commission was
satisfied by similar facts in a compliance proceeding. Ruberoid Co., No. 5017, FTC,

Aug. 26, 1960.
18. Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 242 (1951). The same result follows
where the seller fails to maintain a premium differential. See, e.g, MinneapolisHoneywell Regulator Co. v. FTC, 191 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 344
U.S. 206 (1952) ; Champion Spark Plug Co., 50 F.T.C. 30 (1953).
19. FTC v. Standard Brands, Inc., 189 F.2d 510, 515 (2d Cir. 1959). The Commission expressed a similar fear in the present case. Forster Mfg. Co., Trade Reg.

Rep.

16243, at 21087 (FTC Transfer Binder 1963). Contra, FTC v. Sun Oil Co.,

371 U.S. 505, 522 (1963).

20. Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 231 F.2d 356, 366 (9th Cir. 1955),

cert. denied, 350 U.S. 991 (1956).
21. FTC v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746, 759 (1945).
22. 155 F.2d 1016 (2d Cir. 1946). The court held that the seller must show that
he did not mean to undercut his competitor.
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information or in the absence of "good faith". This position is essential
if the defense is to have any real significance.
The further issue of the permissible scope of the seller's reduced
price is also the subject of controversy. The statutory language only
sanctions a price cut to meet competition, not to increase sales. Consequently one position adopts the view that the proviso only allows for
23
It
economic reprisals made in self-defense to retain old customers.
prohibits the gaining of new customers even where unintentional and
precludes area-wide cuts regardless of the severity of the market.
On the other hand, however, one court has allowed a reduction
over a wide area in response to frequent price cuts by numerous but
individually insignificant competitors.24 And the Seventh Circuit, after
considering the problems inherent in classifying a customer as old or new,
concluded that the distinction was unworkable. 25 The desirable result
would be to permit the acquisition of new customers, subject to the
limitation of "good faith". This would prevent sellers from defeating
the purposes of section 2(a) without imposing excessive restrictions upon
them.
The divergent views of courts and Commission on the several
section 2(b) issues reflects a more basic conflict over the place of the proviso
in anti-trust legislation generally. The provision was enacted to afford
sellers a method of combating price raids by their competitors.26 Yet
since it frequently allows a particular purchaser to obtain a lower price
than other buyers, it often conflicts with the primary purpose of section
27
2(a) - the prevention of injury to competition at the secondary level.
To the extent that the defense is expanded, the principal goal of the act
is impaired.
Consequently the present status of the defense is completely satisfactory to no one. In view of the many uncertainties surrounding
it, the defense has obviously been inadequate as a practical guide for
the competing seller. Moreover, where a rigid interpretation of the
statute is followed, the burden placed upon the seller is almost impossible
to satisfy. Yet the attitude of the Commission remains one of complete
opposition to the defense.
This was illustrated in a recent series of companion cases. 28 In
its attempt to rid the carpet industry of undesirable pricing practices,
23. Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 242, 249, 250 (1951); Standard
Motor Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 265 F.2d 674, 677 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
826 24.
(1959).
Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 231 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1955),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 991 (1956).
25. Sunshine Biscuits, Inc. v. FTC, 306 F.2d 48, 52 (1962) ; see generally 8 ViLL.
I. Rev. 43 (1963).
26. Rowe, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT, 212-13
(1962). See generally, id. 208-15; AUSTIN, PRICE DISCRIMINATION 93-95 (1959).
27. This contrasts with the original provision of the Clayton Act which was
oriented toward primary line injury.
28. Bigelow-Sanford Co., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. f"16800 (1964).
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the Commission was faced with formidable section 2 (b) defenses presented
by two of the manufacturers. Their price cuts, which were reluctantly
undertaken, seemed absolutely necessary to retain any share of the
market. Apparently fearing that sustaining these defenses would permit
reciprocal justifications resulting in immunizing the entire industry, the
Commission went to new and questionable lengths to reject them. 29 This
is a clear instance of the Commission's attaining what it believed to be
a desirable result at the expense of the defense. In addition the Commission stated that the defense should receive a narrow reading within
30
judicially established bounds.
Despite the Commission's restricted view of the defense, it seems
clear that it serves an essential purpose. Without it, the large seller
would have no recourse to the price raids of smaller local competitors.
He would have to choose between making a uniform price reduction to
all of his customers or allowing other sellers to capture his trade. It is
further evident that the seller is entitled to a clarification of the burden
he must meet in order to successfully invoke the defense. A liberal
interpretation of the proviso is essential if the defense is to have any
practical significance.
The present case affords real hope that these objectives will be
accomplished. It confirms the trend away from rigid and impractical
positions, and should allow the seller to compete in a wider variety
of situations. It is a flexible standard, t which allows the seller to
deviate from the literal requirements of the statute where the precise
information needed to insure compliance cannot be obtained. There is
little reason to fear that it will seriously affect competition on the
secondary level; the seller remains subject to the requirement of "good
faith" which will prevent the defense from being used for improper
motives. And the Commission will still be able to insist on some substantiating factors before accepting a defense.
It is submitted that the courts, having expressed dissatisfaction with
the defense as developed by the Commission, should take the opportunity afforded by this decision to uniformly adopt a position which is
reasonable in light of both the needs of the seller and the purposes
enunciated in section 2(a).
Edward J. O'Mallev
29. See dissenting opinion of Commissioner Elman, id. at 21757-65.
30. Id. at 21754-55.
31. As the Commission has stated, "Rigid rules and inflexible absolutes are
especially inappropriate in dealing with the 2(b) defense; the facts and circumstances of the particular case . ..should govern its interpretation and application."
Continental Baking Co., Trade Reg. Rep.
16720, at 21645 (FTC Transfer Binder
1963).
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Tuck v. Tuck (N.Y. 1964)
Plaintiff and defendant were married in New Jersey. The ceremony,
unknown to the plaintiff, was a sham. Afterwards the parties returned
to New York and cohabited for approximately nine months. At that
time, the defendant informed the plaintiff that they had not been legally
married, adding that he planned to marry someone else. Plaintiff then
initiated an action for deceit. The Court of Appeals held that the action
had not been outlawed by New York's heart balm statute whid-h had
abolished rights of action for "alienation of affections, criminal conversations, seduction, or breach of contract to marry."' Tuck v. Tuck, 14 N.Y.2d
341, 200 N.E.2d 554 (1964).
Without the heart balm statute, the facts advanced by the plaintiff
2
would present no problem in the establishment of an action for deceit there being a known, fraudulent misrepresentation used to the prejudice
and damage of the person imposed upon.3
Many states, in answer to widespread public attacks on such actions
as vehicles of blackmail, enacted statutes to either eliminate or restrict
actions for breach of promise, alienation of affections, criminal conversation, and seduction.4 In accordance with this policy it had been
pointed out that "courts cannot escape the burden of construing legislation
as sweeping as this, so as to eliminate the evils aimed at without
destroying rights not considered by the legislature, whose continued
existence may be important to society and to individuals." 5
The courts, cognizant of the force of expression that associated itself
with the various statutes, stressed the policy 6 rather than the letter
1. N.Y. CIVIL PRACTICt ACT art. 2-A, § 61-a et seq. (McKinney 1957) (now
N.Y. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW art. 8, § 80 et seq. (McKinney 1963)).
2. Blossom v. Barrett, 37 N.Y. 434 (1868), held that in the absence of any
statutory prohibition, a woman has an action in deceit against a man for inducing a
putative marriage by knowingly false representations where in fact he has no capacity
to marry.
3. PROSSER, TORTS (2d ed. 1955) at 521-22 (2d ed. 1955).
4. Morris v. MacNab, 25 N.J. 271, 135 A.2d 657 (1957).
5. Feinsinger, Legislative Attack on "Heart Balm," 33 MICH. L. Rv. 979, 1000
(1935). For the majority view in the pre-heart balm era see Jekshewitz v. Groswald,
265 Mass. 413, 164 N.E. 609 (1929), which held that a woman who cohabits after a
sham marriage ceremony has a cause of action for damages against the man for his
fraud and deceit in misleading her into such a sham marriage and the following illegal
cohabitation.
6. One of the best examples of this policy is found in the preamble to the N.Y.
CIVIL PRACTICiE ACT § 61-a (1935).
(These) actions ... having been subjected to grave abuses, causing extreme
annoyance, embarrassment, humiliation, and pecuniary damage to many persons
wholly innocent and free of any wrong doing . . . . and such remedies having
been exercised by unscrupulous persons for their unjust enrichment, and . . .
having furnished vehicles for the commission of crime and . . . the perpetration
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of the laws - disallowing actions that only distantly resembled breach
7
of promise suits. Suits brought on the theories of fraud and deceit,
8
9
false representation, and assault found great difficulty in circumventing
the wide area of prohibition the courts alleged the statutes to cover.
The courts failed to distinguish, as they were urged to, 10 between the
evils which were sought to be eliminated and the rights which were
not meant to be destroyed by the legislation.
New York had gone so far as to bar the recovery of property
transferred in contemplation of marriage." In fact, actions to recover
property on the theory of fraud were also found to be barred by the
statute. 12 One such decision 13 led the New York Revision Commission in
4
1947, to take issue with the courts' strict reading of the statute.1
The rigidity of interpretation that was prevalent in the courts' initial
decisions has undergone a gradual but insistent mollification. The courts'
mellowing is illustrated by the reasoning adopted in a decision to allow
an action to recover damages for the consummation of a bigamous
marriage.'8 The court explained that since such a suit was not susceptible
to abuse by unscrupulous people it was not within the realm of the
heart balm statute. The court also removed the case' from the scope of
the statute by stating that the gravamen of the case was the injury
resulting from the change of status of the parties which it felt was far
17
removed from an action for breach of promise to marry.
the best interests of the people of the state will be served by ...
of frauds ....
(their) abolition ...
7. A.B. v. C.D., 36 F. Supp. 85 (E.D. Pa. 1940), aff'd, 123 F.2d 1017 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 314 U.S. 691 (1941).

8. Sulkowski v. Szewczyk, 255 App. Div. 103, 6 N.Y.S.2d 97 (4th Dept. 1938).
9. Thibault v. Lalumiere, 318 Mass. 72, 60 N.E.2d 349 (1945).
10. Op. cit. supra note 5.
11. Josephson v. Dry Dock Say. Inst., 266 App. Div. 992, 45 N.Y.S.2d 120 (1st
Dept. 1943), aff'd mere., 292 N.Y. 666, 56 N.E.2d 96 (1944) (replevin) ; Nosonowitz

v. Kahn, 201 Misc. 863, 106 N.Y.S.2d 836 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1951).
12. Andie v. Kaplan, 263 App. Div. 884, 32 N.Y.S.2d 429 (2d Dept.), aff'd Inen.,
288 N.Y. 685, 43 N.E.2d 82 (1942).
13. Id.
14. REPORT OF N.Y. LAW REvISION COMMISSION FOR 1947 at 229-30.
The aim of the Act was to do away with excessive claims for damages coercive
by their very nature and, all too frequently, fraudulent character. Denial of
recovery of property transferred in contemplation of marriage is not necessary to
the accomplishment of this object, and it has the undesirable result of placing
it within the power of a recipient to renounce a promise and yet retain property
bestowed in anticipation of performance. This thought of unjust enrichment was
emphasized by the dissenting justices in Andie v. Kaplan [263 App. Div. 884,
32 N.Y.S.2d 429 (2nd Dept.), aff'd mem., 288 N.Y. 685] who wrote that 'the
purpose of the new legislation was to prevent a recovery for alleged pecuniary loss,
blighted affections, wounded pride, humiliation, and the like, against the one who
violated the promise, but not to enable the latter to receive benefits out of his
willful act ....
This suggestion was passed by the legislature but vetoed by the Governor. REPORT OF
N.Y. LAW REvISION COMMISSION FOR 1948 at 21.
15. Synder v. Synder, 172 Misc. 204, 14 N.Y.S.2d 815 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
16. Contra, Sulkowski v. Szewczyk, 255 App. Div. 103, 6 N.Y.S.2d 97 (4th Dept.
1938). In this case the plaintiff merely accepted the proposal of marriage.
17. Synder v. Synder, 172 Misc. 204, 14 N.Y.S.2d 815 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
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New Jersey likewise interpreted its statute as intended "to prevent
recovery of damages for loss of the promised advantage of marriage,
but . . . not . . . to preclude an action for restitution of specific property

or money transferred on a defendant's fraudulent representation that he
could or would lawfully marry the plaintiff."18
The Tuck decision, when viewed in the light of the aforementioned
decisions, is but an extension of the reasoning applied by those courts
to encompass those actions to recover damages resulting from the consummation of a fraudulently unsolemnized marriage.
Tuck concerns itself with two basic questions: (1) Whether or
not "it is error to presume equality between promise of marriage and
fraudulent pretense of marriage as civil causes of action;"19 (2) Whether
a distinction can be made between "defendant's fraud and misrepresentation with respect to celebration of a marriage and defendant's fraud
20
and misrepresentation with respect to marriage or health."
The lower court was not ready to exclude this action from the
prohibitions of the statute. It held that those cases involving a fraudulent
inducing of a bigamous or other marriage legally solemnized, but void
or voidable for other reasons besides the solemnization, were distinguishable since the gravamen of the wrong in such cases is "not the unfulfilled
promise of marriage and fraud and deceit therewith but, rather, ...
the fraudulent consummation of the marriage."' 2 1 The meretriciousness
of the court's decision is clear when one asks what the difference is between a void bigamous marriage and a sham ceremony. There is none.
The woman in both instances is unmarried and seduced, placed in that
position, in both instances, by the fraudulent misrepresentations of the
defendant.
The reasoning of the dissent in the lower court is more persuasive
than the majority's claim that the action for deceit was actually an
action for breach of promise and seduction and therefore barred by the
heart balm statute. The dissent found that both types of marriages were
void and that consequently the legal effect of both were the same. It
stated that:
While there may be differences between a void bigamous
marriage and one which is void for failure properly to solemnize
it, those differences should not lead to any distinction in treatment
where the marriage is induced by fraud. 2 2 . . . it is not the public
policy to enable the utilization and exploitation of the marriage
ceremony for a fraudulent
purpose be it in the form of a bigamous
23
or sham marriage.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Morris v. MacNab, 25 N.J. 271, 278, 135 A.2d 657, 661 (1957).
Tuck v. Tuck, 14 N.Y.2d 341, 344, 200 N.E.2d 554, 556 (1964).
Id. at 344.
Tuck v. Tuck, 18 App. Div. 2d 101, 103, 238 N.Y.S.2d 317, 322 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
Id. at 323-24.
Id. at 324.
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The court in the Tuck decision followed the view of the dissent in
the lower court and came to the conclusion that there was no distinction
between the types of cases.24 Addressing itself to the question of the
abolition of the action under the heart balm statute, the court employed
its interpretation of the legislative intent to offset any argument for
exclusion.
This legislation was not designed to, and did not, outlaw a cause
of action for inducing a woman to enter into a void marital relationship by means of a sham and pretended ceremony. While a
promise of marriage may underlie both this type of action and those
encompassed by the statute, the wrong complained of by the plaintiff
in this case is not that the defendant seduced her or that he broke
his promise to marry her but that he induced her to live with him
as his wife by falsely representing that the ceremony, which he had
arranged,2 5 was legitimate and that they were duly and properly
married.

The tone of the court is closely analogous to that used in those court
decisions previously mentioned while examining the development in the
liberal interpretation of heart balm statutes.
The significance of the Tuck decision rests in its departure from
the unbending interpretation generally given heart balm statutes. It
is doubtful whether the change of status of a party because of a fraudulent
misrepresentation was meant to be included among those actions abolished
by the statute. There is a vast difference between the woman who
allows herself to be seduced on a promise to marry and a woman who
is "seduced" after a marriage ceremony, whether the marriage be invalid
because the ceremony was a sham or because of the incapacity of the
other party to marry.
Even more disconcerting is that the realistic result of the abolishment
of the deceit action in Tuck would be a legally acceptable form of
sexual frolic to the damage of an innocent party. The statute was
meant to deter gullible or ill-conceiving people from turning their experience into an assault on the other party to the adventure.
From recent trends in the area,26 with the Tuck decision now the
farthest extension the probable direction ensuing from the results of
this case will be a more liberal view toward the supposed inhibitions
thought to be included in heart balm statutes.
Jeffrev Averett Brodkin
24. Alexander v. Kuykendall, 192 Va. 8, 63 S.E.2d 746 (1951); McGhee v.
McGhee, 82 Idaho 367, 353 P.2d 760 (1960).
25. Tuck v. Tuck, 14 N.Y.2d 341, 345, 200 N.E.2d 554, 557 (1964).
26. Morris v. MacNab, 25 N.J. 271, 135 A.2d 657 (1957) ; Langley v. Schumacker,
46 Cal. 2d 601, 297 P.2d 977 (1956). The Langley case is extremely interesting
because of the reasoning behind the decision. The court made a distinction between
actions arising ex contractu and actions arising ex delicto - claiming that the statute
applied to an action based on a contract and not to a tort based on a fraudulent
promise. It has been suggested that this distinction means that a mere rephrasing of
the complaint to allege fraud will detour the purpose of the statute.
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In Re Coe (N.J. 1964)
The testatrix executed her will and died shortly thereafter. In the
will, she directed the trustees of her estate to pay one-half of the net
income of the estate to her foster child' for life, with a remainder of fifty
thousand dollars to the lawful children of said life tenant. The foster
child, an infant when she came to the testatrix, was never formally
adopted. Subsequently she married, had no natural children, 2 but did
adopt two daughters. When she died, the question arose as to whether
her adopted daughters were entitled to the remainder under the will of the
testatrix. The superior court 3 held that the adopted children of the deceased
life tenant were not entitled to the bequest made to the lawful children of the
life tenant by testatrix because,

". .

.a provision for a 'child,' 'children' or

'4
'issue' of another is presumed not to include an adopted child or children."
(Emphasis added.) On appeal, the supreme court held that the adopted
children of the life tenant were "lawful children" within the will of the
testatrix and were entitled to take under the bequest. In re Coe, 48 N.J.
485, 201 A.2d 571.
The right of adoption while known to ancient civilizations,5 was
unknown to the common law of England, probably due to the nature of
the feudal system and its adherence to the principles of consanguinity. 6
It exists in this country only by virtue of statute. 7 Absent the guide of
common law, the law of adoption necessarily developed with a marked
degree of disorder and inconsistency. Early statutes dealt primarily with
procedural aspects and only incidentally with attendant rights of inheritance.
These early laws proved inadequate almost at their inception.
Many states allow the adopted child to share in the distribution of
both the real and personal property of his natural parents, 8 while others

1. A- foster child is defined in law as one who has been cared for by a foster
parent; a foster parent is a man or woman who has performed the duties of a parent
to the child of another by rearing the child as an own child. In re Norman's Estate,
209 Minn. 19, 295 N.W. 63, 66 (1940).
2. A natural child is defined as a bastard; a child born out of lawful wedlock.
But in a statute declaring that adopted children shall have all the rights of "natural"
children, the word "natural" was used in the sense of "legitimate." Barns v. Allen,
9 AM. LAW REG., O.S. 747 (1861). This case arose in the Carroll Common Pleas
Court of Indiana. BLACK LAW DICTIONARY 303 (4th Ed. 1951).
3. In re Estate of Coe, 77 N.J. Super. 181, 185 A.2d 696 (Ch. Div. 1962).
4. In re Wehrhane, 23 N.J. 205, 128 A.2d 681 (1957).
5. Hockaday v. Lynn, 200 Mo. 456, 98 S.W. 585 (1906) ; Oler, Construction of
Private Instruments Where Adopted Children Are Involved, 43 MICH. L. REv. 705
(1945) 1 Am. JUR. Adoption of Children § 3 (1948).
6. Hockaday v. Lynn, supra note 4; Ross v. Ross, 129 Mass. 243, 37 Am. Rep. 321
(1880);

SCHOULER, DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 232 (5th ed. 1895).

7. In re Taggart, 190 Cal. 493, 213 Pac. 504 (1923) ; In re Jackson, 55 Nev. 174,
28 P.2d 125 (1934) ; Betz v. Horr, 276 N.Y. 83, 11 N.E.2d 548 (1937) ; 1 AM. JUR.,
op. cit. supra note 4.
8. FLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 731.30 (1963) ; Mt. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 158,
§ 40 (1954) ; TmX. PROB. CODE § 40 (1956).
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prohibit him from inheriting anything. 9 As to his adoptive parents, the
weight of authority in this country is that the child inherits from, but
not through them. 10
While the right of an adopted child to take property passing by
intestate succession is fairly clear, his right to succeed to an estate limited
to the "children," "issue" or "heirs of the body" of the adoptive parent has
been the subject of extensive litigation. The essential question whether
the child is comprehended by a given designation in a private instrument
turns on the intention of the instrument's maker." In determining this
intention, it is necessary to consider the facts and circumstances surrounding the making of the will. 1 2 Knowledge and approval of the adoption

by the testator would be a consideration which would favor the inclusion
of an adopted child ;13 an adoption taking place after the death of the
testator would create a strong presumption against inclusion. 14 Where
there is no extrinsic evidence as to the testator's intention, the court must
apply general rules of construction.
In the absence of statute, a gift to a child of one other than the
testator prima facie means that beneficiary's natural child - not an adopted
child. 15 If the gift is to a child of the testator, it is said prima facie to
include an adopted child.' 6 These presumptions, which embody the common
9. CAL. PROD. CODE div. 2,
VA. CODE ANN. § 63-358 (1950).

§ 257 (1956) ; N.C. GEN.

STAT.

§ 29-17 (1949);

10. In re Pierce's Estate, 32 Cal. App. 2d 265, 196 P.2d 1 (1948) ; Woods v.
Crump, 283 Ky. 675, 142 S.W.2d 680 (1940) ; Van Derlyn v. Mack, 137 Mich. 146,

100 N.W. 278 (1904); Hockaday v. Lynn, 200 Mo. 456, 98 S.W. 585 (1906); 16 Sw.
L.J. 528 (1962). A few jurisdictions, however, have allowed the adopted child to
inherit both from and through his adoptive parents. Stearns v. Allen, 183 Mass. 404,
67 N.E. 349 (1903) ; In re Waddell's Estate, 131 Wash. 566, 230 Pac. 822 (1924)
In re Caldwell's Estate, 26 Wyo. 412, 186 Pac. 499 (1920).
11. Puterbaugh's Estate, 261 Pa. 235, 104 Att. 601 (1918); 16 Sw. L.J. 528
(1962) ; 4 PAGE, WILLs 26 (3d ed. 1961).
12. In re Upjohn's Will, 304 N.Y. 366, 107 N.E.2d 492 (1952).
13. Ibid.

14. Appeal of Wildman, 111 Conn. 683, 151 Atl. 265 (1930); Comer v. Comer,
195 Ga. 79, 23 S.E.2d 420 (1942) ; Stout v. Cook, 77 N.J. Eq. 153, 75 Atl. 583 (1910) ;
In re Fisler, 131 N.J. Eq. 310, 25 A.2d 265 (1942) ; accord, 31 So. CAL. L. Rgv. 441
(1958) :
It is a general rule that a testator who makes provision for a 'child' or
'children' of another is presumed not to have intended to include an adopted child,
where the adoption occurred after the death of the testator, and where there is
no evidence to the contrary.
This has also been effected by the Pennsylvania Wills Act of 1947. PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 20, 180.14(6) (1963). The Commissioner's comment on this clause states the
reason for requiring adoptions to be made before the testator's death to be that it
avoids the possibility of adoptions for the sole purpose of preventing a gift over in
default of issue. This is not overly convincing since in the adoption proceeding, an
extensive investigation is conducted as to the motivation for the adoption. If improper
motives are discovered, the adoption petition will be denied. See PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 1, § 4 (1963) ; N.J.S.A. tit. 9, 3-27 (1960). A second rebuttal to this reasoning
is that if the testator desired to exclude adopted children, he could have done so by
express language in the will. Cave's Estate, 326 Pa. 358, 192 Atl. 460 (1937).
15. This is known as the "stranger to the adoption" concept; accord, Mooney
v. Tolles, 111 Conn. 1, 149 Atl. 515 (1930) ; Ahlemeyer v. Miller, 102 N.J.L. 54,
131 Atl. 54 (1925) ; In re Leask, 197 N.Y. 193, 90 N.E. 652 (1910) ; 4 PAGE, op. cit.
supra note 11, at 435.
16. Appeal of Wildman, 111 Conn. 683, 151 Atl. 265 (1930) ; Wilder v. Butler,
116 Me. 389, 102 Atl. 110 (1917) ; 4 PAGE, op. cit. supra note 11, at 437.
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law doctrine of consanguinity, 17 have been applied even in states which give
18
adopted children many of the rights of natural children.
There is a lagging, but nonetheless, noticeable trend toward complete
legal equivalence between relationship by adoption and relationship by
blood. At present, however, such equivalence is far from attained. 19 In
the. majority of jurisdictions throughout the country, statutes do provide
that the child shall be the child of the adopter "to all legal intents and
purposes, '' 20 or other words indicating a status equivalent to that of a
natural born child.21 This legislative spirit has also been manifest in the
case law of many states, notably New Jersey ;22 but never have the courts
rejected the "stranger to the adoption" concept. When the adopting
parent is not the testator, there is still a presumption against the inclusion
23
of an adopted child within the term "children.
California was the first state to abrogate the doctrine. 24 With no
extrinsic evidence of the testatrix' intention before it, the court relied
entirely upon public policy as set forth by the legislature stating, ". . The
court must assume unless a contrary intent is expressed, that he intended
that his will would fit it [sic] and be compatible with the general body of
law and public policy." 2 5 In essence, there is now in California, in the
absence of express testamentary language to the contrary, a rebuttable
presumption that the testator intended to include adopted children. 26
In the present case, New Jersey has completely rejected the "stranger
to the adoption" doctrine. In reversing the superior court decision, the
supreme court enforced the state's legislative policy and fully recognized
17. Hockaday v. Lynn, 200 Mo. 456, 98 S.W. 585 (1906).
18. This would also include the right of inheritance. Accord: Puterbaugh's Estate,
261 Pa. 235, 104 Atl. 601 (1918); Cochran v. Cochran, 43 Tex. Civ. App. 259, 95
S.W. 731 (1906) ;31 So. CAL. L. Rxv. 441 (1958).
19. Oler, supra note 5, at 705.
20. ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 5 (1958) ; A~iz. REv. STAT. § 8-108 (1956) ; COLO. Rev.
STAT. c. 4, § 1-11 (1953) ; Mo. STAT. ANN. § 453.090 (1952) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
10, § 50 (1941) ; R.I. GEN. LAWS C. 15, § 7-12 (1956).
21. CONN. GN. STAT. ANN. § 45-65a (1960); IDAHO CODE tit. 16, §§ 1507, 1508
(1948) ; N.v. Rgv. STAT. tit. 11, § 127.160 (1963) ; N.J.S.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 3-30
(1960); N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 117 (1964).
22. In Book's Will, 90 N.J. Eq. 549, at 553, 107 Atl. 435, at 437 (1919), the
court stated:
We are of the opinion that the legislative intent to be gathered from a
reading of all these statutes was to vest in adopted children all the rights and
privileges which by the act concerning wills . . . , had been conferred upon
children born in wedlock; that is to say, to place them in the same position as
if they had been natural born children of the decedent, so far as those statutes
are concerned - to substitute the lawful children of the decedent, no matter
what the source of their origin, in the place of those born of his body.
And in Dulfon v. Keasbey, 111 N.J. Eq. 223, at 227, 162 Atl. 102, at 104 (1932),
it was held:
Where the testamentary intention is indefinite or obscure, an adopted child
may take under it if his status answers the descriptions of the will. The statutory
system supplies the intention; he takes by designation of the system.
Accord, Haver v. Herder, 96 N.J. Eq. 554, at 558, 126 Ati. 661, at 662 (1924).
23. In re Pierce's Estate, 32 Cal. 2d 265, 196 P.2d 1 (1948); In re Wehrhane,
23 N.J. 205, 128 A.2d 681 (1957) ; 5 AMERIcAN LAW OF PROPFRTY § 22.34 (Casner
ed. 1952).
24. Estate of Heard, 49 Cal. 2d 514, 319 P.2d 637 (1957).
25. Id. at 522, 319 P.2d at 642.
26. 31 So. CAL. L. Rgv. 441, 444 (1958).
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the rights of the adopted child. Referring to the adoption statute,27 the
court held that, "this statute goes beyond merely prescribing a right of
inheritance between adopting parent and adopted child. It expressly
provides for cross-inheritance between natural and adopted children of
the adopting parent, 28s and inferentially contemplates that the adopted
child may also take from lineal kin. 29 It refuted the "stranger to the adoption" concept as a general rule of construction. It reasoned that it is highly
improbable that a stranger to the adoption would differentiate between
the natural and the adopted children of another, 30 and that, since the
statutes refer to the adopted child as a full member of the family the doctrine had no basis in statute. It was contrived to meet circumstances
different from those at bar,8 1 and should not be applied as a general rule
of construction in a probate situation.
Once the court rid itself of this concept, it was left to determine
whether the adopted daughters could take under the term "children." In
construing the statute,32 the court decided that the adopted children were
equally entitled to take property under the will unless such property was
"expressly limited to the heirs of the body" of the adopting parent.8 3 The
court found nothing in the will that manifested any intent to disinherit the
adopted children. Since the legislature had commanded that an adopted
child shall take unless the intent to exclude is unmistakable, in the absence
of such an intention, the court held that the adopted daughters of the
foster child were "children" within the meaning of the will.
This decision is a milestone in the case law of New Jersey. It gives
to an adopted child a status almost equivalent to that of a natural born
child. It represents a solid position in favor of the adopted child, and is in
accordance with both legislative intent and public policy.
Joseph A. Tate
27. N.J.R.S. 9:3-9 (since superseded by N.J.S.A. 9:3-30, enacted in 1953, c. 264,
§ 14). The statute reads as follows:
Upon the entry of a decree of adoption, .. the child shall be invested with
every legal right, privilege, obligation and relation . .

.

. as if born to them

(adopting parents) in lawful wedlock. If the adopting parent or parents shall
have other child or children, the children by birth and by adoption shall, respectively, inherit from and through each other, as if all had been children of the
same parents born in lawful wedlock.
28. In re Coe, 42 N.J. 485, 201 A.2d 571, 574 (1964).
29. The important point is that the statute reflects the feeling and attitude of
the average man and hence its policy should be followed unless the benefactor
explicitly reveals a contrary purpose. Id. at 574.
30. In re Coe, 42 N.J. 485, 201 A.2d 571, 575 (1964), the court stated:
Rather it is more likely that they accept the relationships established by the

parent whether the bond be natural or by adoption and seek to advance those
relationships precisely as the parent would. None of us discriminate among
children of a relative or friend upon a biological basis. We ought not to impute
to others instincts contrary to our own.
31. Ahlemeyer v. Miller, 102 N.J.L. 54, 131 At. 54 (1925), (if adopted child
took, a provision for the benefit of direct blood line would have been defeated.)
32. N.J.S.A. 9:3-30 (1954).
33. The court states: "Wills, too, must be read and construed in harmony with
the legislative policy of placing adopted children on a level with natural born offspring."
In re Coe, 42 N.J. 485, 201 A.2d 571, 574.
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WILLS

-

EXECUTION By TESTATRIX -

SIGNATURE IN

ATTESTATION

CLAUSE SATISFIED REQUIREMENT OF SIGNATURE AT
THE END THEREOF.

Miller Will (Pa. 1964)
The decedent had completed the blank spaces of a standard printed
will form, providing for the payment of her debts, several charitable
bequests and the appointment of an executor. However, she completely
ignored the signature line provided on the form and, instead, affixed
her signature in the attestation clause underneath.1 An intestate heir,
claiming that the statutory requirement that "every will . . .be signed
by the testator at the end thereof ....-2had not been fulfilled, appealed
the decision of the Orphans' Court of Indiana County which admitted the
will to probate. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the lower
decision, holding that the instrument indicated, on its face, that the
decedent intended to and did affix her signature at the end of her testamentary disposition when she wrote her name into the attestation clause.
The use of the pronoun my was emphasized by the court as a manifestation
of a present intention that her signing serve as a testamentary signature
to the document she obviously regarded as her last will and testament. 3
Miller Will, 414 Pa. 385, 200 A. 2d 284 (1964).
The problem of proper execution of a will by the testator is not
new to the common law. The original English Statute of Frauds4
contained a provision which required that a will be executed by the
testator, although it did not provide that the signature be in any specific
location. In a case involving the interpretation of this statute, it was
held that the signature could be affixed anywhere, at the end, beginning,
or even in the margin. Nor did the opinion place any emphasis upon the
testator's intention that the writing serve as his testamentary signature. 5
Today, all jurisdictions have a statute which is derived in some way from
1. The attestation clause was executed as follows:
Signed, sealed, published and declared by the above named Clara Edna Miller
as and for my last Will and Testament, in the presence of us, who have hereunto
subscribed our names at .................. request as witnesses thereto in the
presence of the said Testat .............................. and of each other.
Harry W. Atkins /s/
Mary M. Atkins /s/
[Italicized portion in decedent's own handwriting.]
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.2 (1950).
3. This fact was utilized by the court to distinguish the present case from
Churchill's Estate, 260 Pa. 94, 103 Atd. 533 (1918), which had reached an opposite
result in an almost identical fact situation. In his dissent, Chief Justice Bell declared
that Churchill was controlling, and deplored a gradual weakening of the legislative
mandate requiring certain formalities to be observed.
4. 29 Car. II, c. 3, § V (1677).
5. Lemayne v. Stanley, 3 Lev. 1, 83 Eng. Rep. 545 (C.P. 1681).
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the English statute. However, there are only twelve jurisdictions in the
United States which require that a will be signed at the end thereof.6
The necessity for interpretation of the Wills Act 7 has come before
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on numerous occasions. In one of its
earliest cases, the court said: "The legislature have laid down a rule
so plain that it cannot be evaded without a clear violation of its terms.
No room is left for judicial construction or interpretation. It says that
a will must be signed at the end thereof, and that's the end of it."'
(Emphasis added.) From that time until the instant case there have
been many modifications, interpolations and distinctions made from this
unbending declaration.
The first of these came in Stinson's Estate,9 in which the court
declared that the end of a will is not necessarily measured by its
physical boundaries, but rather by the logical conclusion of the testator's
language. Over the next fifty-five years, the court began to look more
and more to the testamentary purpose of the decedent and also to the
language used in making its determination on the validity of various
documents.' 0 It is interesting to find that in Churchill's Estate"1
which is heavily relied upon in the dissent of Chief Justice Bell in the
instant case, although the court spoke in terms of physical boundaries,
its ultimate decision was based upon the conclusion that the decedent
intended to act as his own scrivener and did not intend his name to
serve as a testamentary signature. This, presumably, is the same testamentary intention which Chief Justice Bell wishes to be ignored in the
instant case.
6. CAL. PROBATE CODE § 50(1); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 731.07(1) (1964) ; GEN.
LAWS OF IDAHO ANN. § 14-303(1) (1948); GEN. STAT. OF KAN. ANN. § 59-606
(1950); REv. CODE OF MONTANA fit. 91, § 107(1) (1958); N.Y. DECEDENT ESTATE
LAW § 21 (1) ; N. DAK. CENT. CODE ANN. ch. 56, § 56-03-02(1) (1960); OHmo REV.
CODE tit. 21, § 2107.03 (1964) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 55(1) (1952) ; PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 20, § 180.2 (1950) ; S.DAK. CODE ch. 56.02, § 56-0210 (1939) ; UTAH CODE
ANN. tit. 74, § 1-5 (1953). Until 1949, Arkansas also had such a requirement
[ARK. REV. STAT. § 60-104 (1948)], but abandoned it when its probate code was
revised [ARK. REV. STAT. § 60-403 (Supp. 1963)], Probate Code of 1949. See generally
17 Notre Dame Law. 270 (1942).
7. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.2 (1950).
8. Wineland's Appeal, 118 Pa. 37, 41, 12 Ati. 301, 303 (1888).
9. 228 Pa. 475, 77 Atl. 807 (1910), noted in 24 HARV. L. REV. 247 (1911)
9 MicH. L. REV. 342 (1911).
10. See Churchill's Estate, 260 Pa. 94, 103 Atl. 533 (1918), in which the decedent
wrote his name in the beginning of the will, in the testimonium clause and in the
attestation clause and the court held that he was acting as his own scrivener; Brown
Estate, 347 Pa. 244, 32 A.2d 22 (1943), in which the presence of words typed to the
right of the testatrix' signature barred the will from probate; Coyne Will, 349 Pa.
331, 37 A.2d 509 (1944), where the court found no logical connection between the
decedent's signature at the top of an alleged holographic will and the remaining
sequence of words; Baldwin Will, 357 Pa. 432, 55 A.2d 263 (1947), noted in 9 U.
PITT. L. Rtv. 239 (1948), where no intrinsic connection was found between three unattached pieces of paper; Kehr Will, 373 Pa. 473, 95 A.2d 647 (1953), in which the
court placed itself "in the testator's armchair," considered the circumstances which
surrounded him and found that the testator had effectively revoked a prior will by
signing a revocation clause at the top of an unexecuted copy of the will.

11. Supra note 10.
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At this point, just when the decisions had begun to follow a more
liberal trend, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court curiously reversed its
direction in two opinions which immediately preceded Miller. In declaring
an alleged will which was enclosed in a signed envelope to be invalid,
the court said: "Whether [the decedent] thought that what she was
enclosing was a valid will . . . is immaterial.' 2 And in Glace Will,'3
in affirming an orphans' court decree setting aside the probate of an
alleged will signed by the testator in the testimonium clause, the court
said:
The language of the Statute could not be clearer; to constitute a
valid will, the writing must be signed by the testator at the end thereof
- any exceptions, modifications or 'ifs ands or buts' would not only
erode but would soon make the statutory requirement meaningless.
• . . It is perhaps unfortunate that decedent's testamentary intentions are frustrated . . . [but] heart-touching claims which appeal
to our sense of Justice often beget bad law. 1 4 (Emphasis added.)

A comparison with several other jurisdictions having statutes similar
to Pennsylvania15 and also with jurisdictions which do not have this
requirement' 6 indicates that the probability of a fraudulent transaction is
not so imminent as the dissent in Miller would present it to be. Although
California, New York and Ohio have construed their statutes very
strictly on occasion, 17 other .states have successfully followed a more
liberal line of decision.' 8
The essential question is whether is should be necessary for a will
to be signed at the end or if the signature of the testator is an adequate
formality to validate the instrument. For the most part, determination
of the validity or invalidity of a signature itself has not been an especially
difficult problem. A signature consists both of the act of writing one's
name and of intention thereby to finally authenticate the instrument. 19
In applying a definition such as this, courts will look to the circumstances
surrounding the writing in making a decision. In Miller, the court
emphasized the use of the word "my" as a manifestation of decedent's
12. Kretz Estate, 410 Pa. 590, 597, 189 A.2d 239, 243 (1963).
13. 413 Pa. 91, 196 A.2d 297 (1964).
14. Id. at 94, 5, 6, 7, 196 A.2d at 299, 300. It is, perhaps, noteworthy that, in
this and the preceding case, Mr. Justice Musmanno, strongly in favor of the Miller
decision, dissented.
15. CAL. PROBATE COD4 § 50(1); N.Y. DECEDENT ESTATs LAW § 21(1); OHIo
REv. COD4 tit. 21, § 2107.03 (1964).
16. ILL. Rgv. STAr. ch. 3, § 43 (1961) ; MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 191, § 1 (1955).
17. In re Howell's Estate, 50 Cal. 2d 211, 324 P.2d 578 (1958) ; Matter of
Andrews, 162 N.Y. 1, 56 N.E. 529 (1900) ; Sears v. Sears, 77 Ohio St. 104, 82 N.E.
1067 (1907).
18. A will signed by a testator, before the ninth and tenth items, was upheld by
the Illinois Appellate Court in Kolowski v. Fausz, 103 Ill. App. 528 (1902). Also, a
will signed at the beginning by a testatrix, obviously intending to formalize the last
disposition of her property, was held to be properly subscribed in Meads v. Earle,
205 Mass. 553, 91 N.E. 916 (1910).
19. Lee v. Vaughan Seed Store, 101 Ark. 68, 71, 141 S.W. 496, 498 (1911).
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intention that the writing serve as a signature and thus distinguished
21
20
the case from Churchill'sEstate and Glace Will.

The problem of a signature at the end, however, has caused a great
deal more difficulty to the courts of various jurisdictions. A will has been
defined as "the duly expressed mind of a competent person as to what
he would have done after his death with those matters and things over
which he has the right of control and disposition. '22 As such, it should
be honored by the courts, rather than nullified on every occasion presented
in which the statutory requirements are not rigidly followed right down
to the last detail demanded by strict interpretation. Certainly, there must
be a point at which a court must void a document which is not legally
sound. However, it is submitted here that the statutes of the minority
jurisdictions which require the signature at the end merely erect a barrier,
which, in the final analysis, is unrealistic. Although courts have repeatedly said that such statutes must be strictly construed and should
not be emasculated and made meaningless by lax interpretations or the
engrafting of exceptions, that is the direction toward which the decisions
are now pointing. Even in Pennsylvania, this situation exists as "the law
does not require the testator to sign at some formal position on the
testamentary instrument, but that he sign his name at the logical end of his
testamentary purpose.

'2

3

The argument advanced for such statutes as that involved in the
principal case is usually phrased somewhat like the following:
It was suggested on the argument of this case that the effect of the
Statute . . . , as strictly construed by this court, is to defeat the

intention of many testators, while the fraudulent addition to wills
was a crime of rare occurrence. The fallacy of this argument
consists in overlooking the fact that the number of frauds prevented
by our wise and simple statute can never be known. We might
as well ask how many
commercial crimes have been prevented by
4
the Statute of Frauds.2
Despite this argument, the majority of jurisdictions have managed to
survive without this type of statute. Although the court speaks of
fallacies, it might also be asked how many testamentary wishes have
been thwarted by strict interpretation of a statute similar to New York's
and Pennsylvania's. Surely, the possibility of fraud or alteration cannot
be as great as described above. To extend the analogous reference to
the Statute of Frauds, it is also a fundamental principle of contract law
20. 260 Pa. 94, 103 Atl. 533 (1918).
21. 413 Pa. 91, 196 A.2d 297 (1964).
22. Rountree v. Rountree, 213 N.C. 252, 254, 195 S.E. 784, 785 (1938).
23. Brief for Pittsburgh Theological Seminary of the United Presbyterian Church
in the United States of America, Appellee, p. 8, Miller Will, 414 Pa. 385, 200 A.2d
284 (1964).
24. Matter of Andrews, 162 N.Y. 1, 11, 56 N.E. 529, 532 (1900).
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that an instrument must be interpreted in such a way as to coincide with
25
the intention of the parties involved.
In a proposal for a Universal Wills Law, 26 there is no requirement
for execution at the end of the document, although it is required that
the testator sign his final disposition. This position, favored by the
majority of jurisdictions at the present time, appears to be the wiser
one. Generally, a testator will be impressed with the solemnity of his
actions and will subscribe to them as a matter of course; but his final
act should not be frustrated merely because he did not meticulously
follow all the prescribed formalities. It would seem that in a situation
involving a printed will form, completed in the testator's own handwriting,
there is a definite testamentary intent which should be honored by the
courts, despite the fact that the individual involved failed to obtain counsel
and execute the document in strict accordance with the legislative mandate.
The Miller decision is a step in the right direction for Pennsylvania
and all jurisdictions which are steadfastly clinging to a similar statute.
The supreme court, instead of attempting to distinguish the facts 'of
this case from those of Churchill's Estate27 should have unequivocally
overruled it. This is especially true since a will composed of a printed
form which is completed in the testator's own handwriting approaches
a holographic will, which, by decision, has been placed outside the
requirements of such statutes.28 Hopefully Pennsylvania will soon go
further, abandon its present position, and fall in line with the majority
of jurisdictions which properly, place more emphasis upon testamentary
intent than observance of technicalities.
Edward Gerald Donnelly, Jr.
25. See 3 WILLISTON, CONTRAc TS § 610 (Rev. ed. 1936). See generally id.
§§ 607-13.
26. 43 A.B.A.J. 139 (1957).
27. 260 Pa. 94, 103 Atd. 533 (1918) ; there the testator wrote "...
his [last
Will and Testament] . . . ," where the testatrix in the instant case wrote, in the
attestation clause, ". . . my [last Will and Testament] . . ."
28. See In re Conlin's Estate, 89 D.&C. 318 (O.C. Cumberland County, 1954)

In re Swendsen's Estate, 43 Cal. App. 2d 551, 111 P.2d 408 (1941) ; In re Bloch's
Estate, 39 Cal. 2d 570, 248 P.2d 21 (1952) ; In re Glass' Estate, 165 Cal. App. 2d 380,
331 P.2d 1045 (1958).
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